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This study considers the completeness of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) evaluative framework, 
designed to identify the performance management and management control issues in 
organisations.  There is growing criticism in the literature that Ferreira and Otleys’ (2009) 
framework is essentially technocratic in nature, ignores socio-ideological controls such as 
organisational culture and clans, and needs to be combined with a social science 
perspective.  Consequently, this study reviews the literature pertaining to certain socio-
ideological controls, using a multi-disciplinary approach which focuses particularly on the 
social sciences.  Combining insights obtained from the literature, the study then applies 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework in an empirical case study setting, assessing the 
extent to which the framework can identify the performance management and control 
issues in a small South African knowledge-intensive company.  Findings from the study 
suggest that Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework is indeed deficient in that it is not able to 
identify cultural controls, clan controls and personnel controls.  The possible implications of 
the cultural paradigm for control system design, conting ncy theory, and the general 

















1.1 Background to the Study 
It has long been recognised in the literature that the management controls and 
management control systems employed by an organisation do not operate in isolation, but 
function instead as a package of controls (Otley, 1980).  However, despite regular calls over 
the years to study the phenomenon (Otley, 1980; Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1998) there has been 
little theoretical or empirical research on the topic (Berry et al, 2009).   
The need to study management control systems as a package is important for a number of 
reasons.  In the first instance, considering management controls as a package would address 
concerns that much of the strategic management control system research has been 
fragmentary, and based on specific elements of control systems (Chenhall, 2003).  Secondly, 
there has also been a tendency in the literature to focus on accounting controls, with very 
few studies addressing social control, clan control, culture and context (Langfield-Smith, 
2007).  This research approach is problematical, as studying specific elements of 
management control systems in isolation from other organisational controls could result in 
the serious under-specification of control models (Chenhall, 2003, p. 131). 
The third, and possibly most important reason why management control systems should be 
examined as a package, is to consider the effect of such packages on performance 
management.  Performance management is a topic with which management accounting has 
increasingly concerned itself in the last two decades, as it moved away from its traditional 
emphasis on financially oriented decision analysis and budgetary control (Ittner and Larcker, 
2001, p.350).  
 Understanding the functioning of management control systems as a package may therefore 
help to develop theory which addresses the range of controls required to drive 
organisational performance (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Bedford, 2006).  This point has also 
been made by Otley (2001), who has expressed the opinion that, if management accounting 
research is to retain its relevance, researchers in the field should move beyond the 















Otley (2001) justifies this claim by pointing out that measuring and managing organisational 
performance has been the focus of many of the ‘new’ value adding techniques of 
management accounting, such as Activity Based Costing, the Balanced Scorecard, and EVA™.  
A number of these techniques have been incorporated in various management control 
systems.  However, there is still not a clear understanding of how these techniques can be 
integrated with other controls so as to optimise organizational performance (Otley, 2001; 
Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
A small group of management control researchers has, since the early 1990s, begun to 
address the issue of performance management.  This has led to the development of a 
handful of integrated performance management systems or frameworks (Berry et al, 2009).   
1.2 Overview of Performance Management Systems/Frameworks 
The management accounting literature recognises three models f integrated performance 
management systems.  These are strategic performance management systems such as 
Kaplan and Norton’s balanced scorecard; Simons’ levers of control model; and Ferreira and 
Otley’s performance management and control framework (Berry et al, 2009; Scapens, 2009).   
This study focuses on Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework, which was developed not as a 
practical strategy management system, but as an evaluative mechanism whereby the 
controls and Management control systems employed by an organisation to manage and 
control its performance can be identified.  It is arguably the most comprehensive evaluative 
framework of the three models identified above, for the following reasons: 
 Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework was based on Otley’s original (1999) 
framework, which has since been revised and expanded in both 2005 and 2009.  
Also, whereas the balanced scorecard was developed as a practical strategic 
management system (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1996), only Simons’ (1995) and 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) frameworks were specifically designed to evaluate other 
performance management systems (Otley, 2003; Ferreira and Otley, 2009). 
 Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework is the most recent of the three performance 
management system models mentioned, and as the balanced scorecard was 
critically evaluated (and found wanting in certain respects) by the application of 
Otley’s original framework (Otley, 1999), it can be assumed that Ferreira and Otley’s 















framework than the balanced scorecard (which in any event was not designed for 
this purpose (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1996)). 
  All aspects of Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control framework were considered in the 
design of Ferreira and Otley’s expanded (2009) framework, and two levers were 
specifically incorporated into the design of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) expanded 
framework (Ferreira and Otley, 2009).  As a result Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
framework may (preliminarily) be assumed to incorporate, or even build on, the best 
features of Simons’ (1995) levers of control framework. 
  It has been proposed that Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework is likely to have an 
important impact on thinking and research in the area of performance management 
and control (Scapens, 2009). 
It therefore seems justifiable that, if management accounting research is to follow Otley’s 
advice to extend its boundaries and concern itself once again with the issues involved in 
designing and operating systems to manage performance (Otley, 2001, p. 243), such 
research could at this point usefully direct itself at examining the completeness of arguably 
the leading and most comprehensive of the current evaluative frameworks, i.e. Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2009) framework. 
An examination of the recent management control literature supports the view that a critical 
evaluation of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework might be appropriate.  Certain writers 
have suggested that this framework is deficient to the extent that it relies too much on 
systems-based design, and largely ignores socio-ideological controls such as personnel 
controls, clan controls and cultural controls (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Collier, 2005).   
This criticism reflects an increased emphasis on socio-ideological controls in the literature, 
with numerous researchers proposing that management control systems should move 
beyond a largely systems-based approach to embrace social forms of control as well 
(Canonico and Söderlund, 2010; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Sandelin, 2008; Bedford, 2006; 
Collier, 2005; Nixon and Burns, 2005; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009).  Hopwood (2008) 
provides further support for this line of thinking, pointing to “...the need for an integration 
of design and social science perspectives, the likes of which we have as yet hardly seen” 















Some writers have even suggested that the current management control framework may no 
longer be valid in the 21st century business environment, where intellectual capital and 
knowledge management are becoming increasingly important (Otley, 1999; Nixon and 
Burns, 2005).  Others have commented on the increased empirical evidence of social forms 
of control in recently published research.  They suggest that the management control 
literature has either over-emphasised the influence of diagnostic and interactive controls 
relative to informal, social controls, or that social controls are becoming more important in 
the 21st century (Nixon and Burns, 2005). 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) did consider certain socio-ideological controls for inclusion in their 
framework.  For example, they acknowledge that organisational culture is an important 
contextual variable that pervades the entire control system (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 
268).  However, culture was not included in the framework as it was considered to be a 
contingent variable that might influence performance management system design, rather 
than an organisational characteristic that can be manipulated (Ferreira and Otley, 2009).  
Despite this omission, it was conceded that some aspects of culture could well be influenced 
by management actions, and that it might be appropriate to include culture in this sense in a 
wider performance management system framework (Ferreira and Otley, 2009).  
It is therefore considered to be of some importance, given the increasing focus on socio-
ideological controls in the management accounting literature, and the perceived 
shortcomings of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework in this regard, to examine the 
possibility that socio-ideological controls should be included in Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
evaluative framework. 
In doing so, and in line with suggestions from the literature, it is also considered appropriate 
that the nature of socio-ideological controls be examined from a social science perspective 
(Hopwood, 2008).  A broader, multi-disciplinary approach will also be taken where relevant, 
to allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the inter-relationship between 
performance management and other related disciplines, such as organisational behaviour 
and psychology (Hopwood, 2008; Nixon and Burns, 2005). 
1.3 Aim of the Study 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether socio-ideological controls, such as 















and Otley’s (2009) performance management system template, designed to identify the 
major control and performance management issues within an organisation. 
As recommended by several authors (Otley, 2003; Hopwood, 2008; Nixon and Burns, 2005) 
the study adopts a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing upon literature from the social, 
management, and behavioural sciences as well as from the field of management accounting. 
As this issue has been examined only to a limited extent in the management control 
literature, this study is regarded as being exploratory in nature. 
1.4 Research Question 
This study sets out to answer the following question: 
“Should Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) performance management framework be expanded to 
include socio-ideological controls as an aspect of management control and performance 
management?” 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
This study has the following objectives: 
 To identify and assess, with reference to the relevant literature, those socio-
ideological controls which can make a positive contribution to management control 
and performance management in organisations. 
 To evaluate the technocratic and socio-ideological management controls employed 
by a small South African consulting firm, using Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
performance management framework and the insights into socio-ideological control 
obtained from the literature review.  
 To re-assess the robustness and adequacy of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework, 
based on the results of the above two objectives.   
1.6 Research Method and Structure of the Study 
This thesis employs a single case study approach.  The case study approach is the method 
advocated by Yin (1994) for the gathering of phenomenological evidence.  This approach is 















(2001), who also endorse the use of data from a single or small number of organisations as 
the most appropriate means of obtaining the quantity and level of data required to answer 
many managerial accounting research questions.  More specifically, Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) suggest that empirical evidence, especially from case study research, is required to 
assess the robustness and validate the adequacy of their (2009) evaluative framework. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows:  In Chapter 2 the recent and relevant literature 
on the relationship between socio-ideological control, management control, and 
performance management is reviewed.  Chapter 3 sets out and justifies the research 
methodology which has been applied.  In Chapter 4 the case study data is presented and 



















This chapter presents a review, interpretation and synthesis of the relevant research relating 
to socio-ideological control in general, and its relationship to management control and 
performance management in particular.  In the first instance, the terms ‘management 
control’ and ‘performance management’ will be discussed, whereafter the nature of socio-
ideological control will be explored. 
The various socio-ideological controls to be included in the study will then be identified, and 
the literature relating to each of these controls will be examined, interpreted, and 
summarised. The potential of these controls to contribute to management control and/or 
performance management systems will then be evaluated.  This in turn will facilitate the 
evaluation of the socio-ideological controls employed by the case study company, as stated 
in Objective 2 of the study.   
2.2 Management Control, Performance Management, and Socio-Ideological Controls 
Although Ferreira and Otley (2009) refer to their evaluative framework as a performance 
management framework, it is intended to identify both management control and 
performance management issues in organisations (Ferreira and Otley, 2009).  For purposes 
of analysis, therefore, the terms ‘management control’ and ‘performance management’ will 
be used separately in this study.   
Although management control has been defined in various ways, it is generally agreed that it 
involves the exercise of power or influence in order to mobilise and coordinate individual 
and collective action towards given objectives (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Speklé, 2001).  More 
recently, these given objectives have been interpreted as being those derived from an 
organisation’s strategic planning process, so that the purpose of management control is 
widely acknowledged to be the implementation of a chosen strategy (Nixon and Burns, 
2005; Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). 
Performance management, on the other hand, goes beyond the implementation of strategy 
to address the management of strategy as well.  This is achieved by incorporating into the 















and adaptation.  This allows organisations to continually evaluate the effectiveness of their 
existing strategies, to consider new strategic opportunities, and to fine-tune and change 
their strategies as necessary (Kaplan and Norton, 2001).   
To understand the specific nature of socio-ideological controls, one needs first to consider 
the various ways in which management control functions.  Management control exerts its 
influence by focusing on worker behaviour, output, and/or the minds of employees 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004).  These various elements of control have been described or 
labelled in different ways by different writers, many of whom have also provided different 
bases of distinguishing one from the other (Chenhall, 2003).   
Controls intended to exert a direct influence on output and behaviour have been labelled, 
for example, as mechanistic (Chenhall, 2003), formal (Collier, 2005), and technocratic 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004).  On the other hand, those controls expected to exert an 
indirect influence on behaviour by targeting minds through norms, emotions, and shared 
beliefs and values, have been variously referred to as normative (Kunda, 1992), concertive 
(Barker, 1993), social (Merchant, 1985b), informal (Collier, 2005), organic (Chenhall, 2003), 
and socio-ideological (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004). 
This study will adopt the labels suggested by Alvesson and Kärreman (2004).  Accordingly, 
those controls which attempt to influence employee mindsets will be referred to as socio-
ideological controls, whereas those intended to control employee behaviour directly will be 
known as technocratic controls.   
Chenhall (2003) has suggested that a variety of control taxonomies are possible, and are a 
useful means of addressing concerns of how management control systems relate to broader 
control systems.  The various taxonomies can also guide research into how particular aspects 
of management control systems are consistent with the control ‘culture’ of an organisation 
(Chenhall, 2003, p. 132). 
This study will employ the control taxonomy of Malmi and Brown (2008), who identified two 
broad categories of socio-ideological controls based on an analysis of nearly four decades of 
management control system research.  By adopting this approach, this study will look to 
build on an established foundation of management control system research.  The socio-
ideological controls identified by Malmi and Brown (2008) were cultural control (comprising 















This investigation will help to address the dearth of research conducted in the area of socio-
ideological control.  For example, Malmi and Brown (2008) state that the socio-ideological 
controls mentioned in the above paragraph have received little attention in empirical 
management control system research.  In similar vein Berry et al (2009), in a review of the 
recent management control systems literature, note that few studies of culture and control 
have been conducted.  Langfield-Smith (1997, 2007) came to a similar conclusion when 
reviewing the literature on strategic performance management, finding that management 
control systems generally adopted too narrow a focus, emphasising formal financial controls 
and omitting social control, clan control, culture and context. 
2.3 Personnel Controls 
Personnel controls are sometimes referred to as personnel/cultural controls (Merchant and 
Van Der Stede, 2007).  Because personnel controls facilitate cultural control in a number of 
ways these controls will be reviewed first, so that the interplay between personnel controls 
and cultural control can be better appreciated in the subsequent review and discussion of 
cultural controls. 
Merchant and Van Der Stede (2007) note that personnel controls build on employees’ 
natural tendencies to control and/or motivate themselves.  They describe personnel controls 
as those controls which serve any of three basic purposes: to clarify the organisation’s 
expectations, to help ensure that each employee has all the capabilities and resources 
necessary to do a good job, and (in respect of some personnel controls) to increase the 
likelihood that each employee will engage in self-monitoring.   
Merchant and Van Der Stede (2007, p. 83) explain that self-monitoring is the naturally-
present force that pushes most employees to want to do a good job, and be committed to 
the organisation’s goals.  They point out that the phenomena underlying self-monitoring 
have been discussed in the management literature under various labels, including self-
control, intrinsic motivation, ethics and morality, trust, and loyalty. 
The main methods employed to implement personnel controls are (1) the selection and 
placement of employees, (2) training, and (3) job design and the provision of necessary 
resources (Merchant and Van Der Stede, 2007, p. 83). 
Snell (1992, p. 297) defines a personnel control as one that regulates the antecedent 















values and motives of employees.  Merchant (1982) maintains that these controls are often 
centred on human resource policies that help ensure that personnel will perform at a high 
level and in congruence with firm goals.   
Examples of personnel control drawn from the literature will be introduced where 
appropriate in the subsequent sections of this chapter.  This will serve to illustrate the 
relationship between personnel controls and certain aspects of cultural control. 
2.4 Organisational Culture  
Before undertaking a detailed review of the literature, the concept of culture will first be 
discussed and defined, and developments in scholarly views of culture will be presented.  
These will essentially be the views of social scientists and writers on organisational 
management.  Unless otherwise indicated, all references to ‘culture’ in this study will relate 
to organisational culture.   
Just as management accounting researchers have differed in their understanding of 
management control and management control systems (Chenhall, 2003), it appears that 
social scientists have similarly failed to arrive at a consensus definition of culture (Hughes, 
2010).  Certain commonalities in definitions of culture have emerged though, as identified by 
Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) in a review of thirty years of organisational culture studies. 
These related to the existence of shared meanings, interpretations, values and norms.   
This study adopts the definition of culture proposed by Schein (2004, p. 17), who describes 
organisational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group 
as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”   
Various social science writers have identified different levels at which culture manifests 
itself.  In a survey of the literature, Hofstede et al (1990) found four such levels, arranged 
from ‘shallow’ to ‘deep.’  These were symbols, heroes, rituals and values. 
Other writers use different terms and groupings for the above-mentioned cultural 
manifestations, but the overall effect is much the same.  For instance, Schein (2004) states 
that culture can be analysed at several different levels, ranging from tangible, overt 















essence of culture.  Schein (2004) refers to the tangible overt manifestations of culture as 
‘artefacts’ (thereby including Hofstede et al’s (1990) symbols, heroes and rituals), while 
values are acknowledged to be the deeply imbedded, unconscious, basic assumptions which 
constitute the essence of culture. 
Conceptually, Schein’s (2004) view of the components of culture conforms in most aspects 
to that of Malmi and Brown (2008) as discussed earlier.  However, where Malmi and Brown 
(2008) refer only to symbols, Schein (2004) uses the term ‘artefacts’ to include not only 
symbols, but other visible expressions of culture as well.  This study will consequently 
examine Schein’s more inclusive concept of artefacts, so as to ensure that symbols and all 
other overt manifestations of culture are considered (Schein, 2004). 
The other difference between Schein’s (2004) and Malmi and Brown’s (2008) 
conceptualisation of culture relates to clans, which the latter researchers consider to be a 
separate form of cultural control and which Schein (2004) regards as a cultural typology.  
(Various universal typologies have been proposed that are presumed to help us understand 
all organisations [Schein, 2004]). 
Schein (2004) sees the clan as being representative of a typology of corporate character and 
culture, character being that component of culture consisting of shared vision, motivational 
faith that things would be fair and that abilities would be used, and distinctive skills, both 
overt and tacit (Schein, 2004, p. 193).  
Clan culture implies a certain form of control, so that there is in effect no contradiction 
between the social science and the management control literatures; it is simply that Schein 
(2004) focuses on the cultural aspects of clans, whereas the management control literature 
focuses on the control aspects of clan culture (Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983).  
Schein’s (2004) classification of culture (i.e. artefacts and values) will be adopted in the 
literature review which follows, while clans will be reviewed as a separate form of cultural 
control as recognised by the management control literature (Malmi and Brown, 2008; 
Chenhall, 2003).   
The literature relating to each of the constituent elements of culture will now be examined.  


















Schein (2004, p. 25) explains that artefacts constitute the surface level of culture, and are 
made up of those phenomena that one sees, hears and feels when encountering a new 
group with an unfamiliar culture.  Artefacts include the architecture of the group’s physical 
environment, its language, its style of clothing, its emotional displays, and the myths and 
stories told about the organisation.  Published lists of values, organisation charts, and 
observable rituals and ceremonies would also be included under this classification. 
Hofstede et al (1990) describe artefacts instead as symbols, heroes, and rituals.  Symbols are 
defined as words, gestures, pictures, or objects that carry a particular meaning within a 
culture.  Heroes are persons who possess characteristics which are highly valued in the 
culture, and who therefore serve as models for behaviour. These heroes can be real or 
imaginary, dead or alive.  Rituals are collective activities that are technically unnecessary but 
socially essential within a culture, and which are therefore carried out for their own sake 
(Hofstede et al, 1990, p. 291). 
Hofstede et al (1990) believe that symbols, heroes and rituals can be grouped under the 
term ‘practices,’ because they are visible to an observer.  Their cultural meaning, however, 
will depend upon the way in which they are perceived by insiders.   
It is apparent that Schein’s (2004) artefacts are akin to Hofstede et al’s (1990) practices, 
thereby including symbols, heroes, and rituals.  Schein (2004) notes that different cultural 
observers report on different sorts of artefacts, which leads to non-comparable descriptions.  
However, Schein (2004) explains that the meanings of artefacts gradually become clear if the 
observer lives in the group long enough.  He also suggests that this level of understanding 
can be achieved more quickly if the observer attempts to analyse the espoused values, 
norms and rules by which the members of the group regulate their behaviour. 
Depending on the writer concerned, artefacts appear to have various functions as far as the 
study of or the effect on culture is concerned.  Researchers such as Hofstede et al (1990), 
Schein (2004), and Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) believe that artefacts can assist in the 
understanding of culture, although Schein (2004) warns that this level of culture is easy to 
observe and very difficult to decipher.   
Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008, p. 39) maintain that culture can be perceived as that which 















symbols in this case referring to language, stories and rituals.  The authors note that culture 
is expressed in behaviour, and can be seen in actions, events and other material aspects.  
However, culture does not refer to these exterior elements as such, but to the meaning and 
beliefs these have for people.  Culture is thus behind and beneath behaviour (Alvesson and 
Sveningsson, 2008). 
Other writers in the field have slightly different views on artefacts.  For example, Johnson 
(1992) defines culture as per Schein’s (2004) definition on page 10 of this study, but refers to 
it as a ‘paradigm’ which is encircled and protected by a web of cultural artefacts (Johnson, 
1992, p. 30).  He identifies this web as consisting of control systems, organisational 
structures, power structures, as well as rituals and routines, stories and myths, and symbols.  
Johnson (1992) believes it would be a mistake to consider the paradigm as merely a set of 
beliefs removed from the organisational action; it is in fact bound to the action of 
organisational life by this cultural web.  As a result, the cultural web can be used as a 
convenient framework for conducting a culture audit of an organisation. 
Yet other researchers believe that cultural change can be effected or at least strongly 
supported by the deliberate changing of artefacts.  Higgins and McAllaster (2004), writing on 
the subject of strategic change, use a case study of Continental Airlines to illustrate how a 
change of cultural artefacts supported a strategic change to become more customer 
focused.  Johnson (1992, p. 36) also believes that a change of artefacts should support 
attempted paradigm change, as this signals change at the level of everyday reality for the 
organisation’s employees. 
Malmi and Brown (2008), citing Schein (1997), suggest when promoting their ‘bundle of 
controls’ framework that symbol-based controls are employed by organisations as visible 
expressions so as to develop a particular form of culture.  They also use the example of 
requiring staff to wear a particular uniform as a means of creating a culture of 
professionalism (Malmi and Brown, 2008, p. 294).  However, as discussed below, this is not 
in accordance with the beliefs of social scientists such as Schein. 
While Schein (2004) acknowledges that there is a mutual interaction between the various 
levels of culture, so that different cultural artefacts could influence culture at the deeper 
levels, he does not suggest that a change of artefacts alone would bring about a new culture.  
However, when trying to bring about cultural change, Schein (2004) does propose the 















Malmi and Brown (2008) had in mind when suggesting that a particular uniform can create a 
culture of professionalism.  If their statement was intended to be taken literally, however, 
Malmi and Brown (2008) have either overstated their case somewhat, or have taken a rather 
superficial view of culture. 
2.4.1.1 Conclusions drawn from the Artefacts Literature 
It seems that artefacts, although representing the most superficial level of culture, play an 
important part in the cultural mix.  They represent a gateway to the deeper levels of culture, 
yet also act as a web which binds and strengthens the culture.  Artefacts interact with the 
other levels of culture, both shaping and being shaped by them.  They represent the most 
visible signs of culture (but are difficult to interpret), and should not be ignored as a 
signalling device when attempting cultural change, or as a means of initiating behavioural 
change.  Artefacts are therefore able to exert an indirect control effect in three different 
ways; by shaping culture, by signalling cultural change, and by initiating behavioural change. 
The concept of control systems as artefacts (Johnson, 1992) has possible implications for the 
existing management control paradigm.  This will be addressed in more detail later in the 
literature review, when considering the interrelationship between the cultural paradigm and 
management control (See page 34). 
2.4.2 Values 
According to a survey of the literature by Hofstede et al (1990, p. 291), values form the core 
of culture, “in the sense of broad, nonspecific feelings of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, 
normal and abnormal, rational and irrational, feelings that are often unconscious and rarely 
discussable, that cannot be observed as such but are manifested in alternatives of 
behaviour.” 
Whereas Hofstede et al (1990) refer simply to ‘values,’ Schein (2004) distinguishes between 
a group’s espoused beliefs and values (what people say, but will not necessarily do), and the 
group’s shared basic assumptions (what they will actually do, based on a conviction, built up 
over time, that such actions are the appropriate way to behave).  Schein (2004) also prefers 
the term ‘shared basic assumptions’ when referring to the basic values which express the 
deepest level of culture.  As he says, whereas values are open to discussion, basic 















Anyone who does not hold these basic assumptions is viewed as an outsider and is 
automatically excluded by members of the culture (Schein, 2004). 
Espoused beliefs and values, then, are proposed by the leader but are only accepted by the 
group once they have been tested and found to work.  Even so, espoused beliefs and values 
only become entrenched if they are seen by the group to work on a regular basis over a 
longer period of time.  Only at this stage do they become shared basic assumptions.  
Espoused beliefs are held at a conscious level, whereas shared basic assumptions have 
become so entrenched that they are held unconsciously.  According to Schein, shared basic 
assumptions are the ultimate sources of values and action and are extremely difficult to 
change (Schein, 2004). 
Empirical research on organisational culture by Hofstede et al (1990) assessed, along with 
the other three levels of culture, the role of values in shaping organisational culture.  
Hofstede et al (1990) examined the cultures of twenty culturally homogeneous 
organisational units within ten companies situated in two different countries (i.e. the 
organisations were based in Denmark and The Netherlands, countries with similar national 
cultures.  So, whereas employees were from the similar Nordic-Dutch cultural grouping, 
there were differences in the organisational cultures of the companies).  The researchers 
employed semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire to collect information on the four 
manifestations of culture identified from the literature, i.e. symbols, heroes, rituals and 
values. 
The research did not find that shared values constituted the core of an organisation’s 
culture, but rather that shared perceptions of employees’ daily practices lay at the heart of 
culture. (‘Practices’ in the context of this study was a blanket term referring to conventions, 
customs, habits, mores, traditions, and usages).   Measurements of employee values were 
found to differ more according to the demographic criteria of nationality, age and education, 
than to membership in the organisation (Hofstede et al, 1990). 
Hofstede et al (1990) note that the US management literature rarely distinguishes between 
the values of founders and significant leaders, and the values of the majority of the 
organisation’s members.  In assessing the extent to which leaders’ messages come across to 
employees, the researchers found that the values of leaders and key leaders shape 
organisational culture, but that culture affects ordinary employees through shared practices 















Referring to DLM, one of the twenty case studies which formed the basis of the study, 
Hofstede et al (1990) observed that employees’ values did not change when a new president 
was appointed.  However, because of the orientation of the new president, the ‘rules of the 
game’ were changed so that new practices could be developed.  (This may perhaps be 
likened to Schein’s (2004) espoused values, which if accepted result in a change of 
behaviour, while not yet being internalised by employees as shared basic assumptions). 
In studying the various organisational cultures, Hofstede et al (1990) found considerable 
differences in practices for people who held roughly the same values.  They attribute this to 
the fact that values are acquired in early youth, so that a child’s mind is programmed with 
most of his or her basic values by the age of ten.  Organisational practices, on the other 
hand, are learned through socialisation in the workplace, which we enter as adults with most 
of our values already firmly in place. 
Hofstede et al (1990) note too that if values depend primarily on demographics, values enter 
the organisation via the hiring process: an organisation recruits people of a certain age, sex, 
nationality, and educational level, with certain values.  Their subsequent socialisation within 
the company occurs as they learn the practices via the organisation’s symbols, heroes and 
rituals. 
It should be noted that one of the weaknesses of the Hofstede et al (1990) study might be 
the methods by which both organisational and personal values were determined.  Interviews 
were of two to three hours duration, and the questionnaires administered comprised of 135 
questions which addressed employees’ perceptions of the four levels of culture, one of them 
being values. 
Researchers such as Schein (2004), and Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008), point out that 
organisational values, or shared basic assumptions, operate at a subconscious level and are 
difficult to discern, sometimes taking many months for a researcher to uncover.  The same 
problem applies to personal values, which are highly complex and deeply held, and are 
difficult for individuals themselves to comprehend (Griseri, 1998). 
It is more likely, then, given the relatively limited timeframe employed by Hofstede et al 
(1990), that the organisational values referred to in their study were espoused values, and 
may not have reflected the more deep-seated shared basic assumptions which actually 
governed behaviour.  Personal values identified by Hofstede et al (1990) were, similarly, 















The possibility that organisational values were espoused values rather than more deeply-
held beliefs seems to be borne out by the TKB case study, where a change in market 
conditions led to the forced early retirement of certain older workers.  The employees 
concerned were shocked by the company’s actions, which did not seem to accord with its 
values (Hofstede et al, 1990). 
2.4.2.1 Values: More Evidence from the Workplace  
The possibility that values enter the organisation via the hiring process (as suggested by 
Hofstede et al, 1990) has been investigated by a number of researchers.  For example, Cable 
and Judge (1996) found that job applicants self-select into organisations based on the 
degree of person-organisation fit.  Positive person-organisation fit was measured as the 
congruence between the job seekers’ perceptions of an organisation’s values, and the job 
seeker’s perceptions of their own values.  This study also found that job seekers placing 
more emphasis on person-organisation fit in their job choice decisions experienced greater 
person-organisation fit after joining their organisations than job seekers placing less 
emphasis on fit. 
 A later study by the same researchers also found that interviewers use person-organisation 
fit when evaluating and hiring applicants (Cable and Judge, 1997).  Results of the study 
showed that interviewers can assess applicant-organisational values congruence with 
significant levels of accuracy, and that these subjective assessments have a large effect on 
their hiring recommendations, and subsequently on the organisation’s hiring decisions. 
Other aspects of Hofstede et al’s (1990) proposals were endorsed by Brown and Trevino 
(2009), who investigated the effects of charismatic leadership in a large health care 
organisation in the US.  The researchers examined the extent to which the values of 
socialised charismatic leaders would be adopted by followers. (Socialised charismatic leaders 
were described as inspirational leaders who are altruistically motivated, and who encourage 
followers to embrace the leader’s internalised values [Brown and Trevino, 2009]). 
It was found that occupational membership and employee demographics have more 
powerful effects on employee values than do socialised charismatic leadership.  They 
suggest that any ability of such leaders to achieve goal congruence is likely to depend on the 
organisational context, and the pre-existing values that followers bring with them to the 















The extent to which values can be imposed by management actions was investigated by 
Buchko (2006), who researched the effects of implementing a values-based-management 
programme in a large US manufacturing company.  A rigorous internal process was followed 
by management and staff, whereby 19 desirable organisational behaviours were identified.  
Managers were then evaluated by staff on the extent to which they exhibited these 
behaviours.  It was found that subordinates of leaders who strongly demonstrated any of the 
identified behaviours, were more likely themselves to exhibit the same behaviours. 
Research by Meglino et al (1989) identified additional benefits to the organisation when 
employees and their supervisors shared (or came to share) similar values.  A survey of 170 
workers in a large US industrial manufacturing plant revealed that, where there was 
congruence between supervisor and employee values, employee satisfaction and 
commitment was higher.  It was also noted that value congruence with the employer’s 
supervisor appeared to be a more significant factor than congruence with the organisations’ 
cultural values when it came to job satisfaction and employee commitment. 
The practical importance of values is emphasised by Welch (2005), who was CEO of the 
General Electric Corporation in the U.S. between 1981 and 2001.  By 1991 the company had 
spent three years developing its values via a consultative process involving over five 
thousand employees.  Some of the desired values (which Welch emphasises are essentially 
behaviours) were: “Act in a boundaryless fashion – always search for and apply the best 
ideas, regardless of their source,” and “Be intolerant of bureaucracy,” and “See change for 
the growth opportunity it brings” (Welch, 2005, p. 18). 
Core values were printed on laminated wallet cards for easy reference by managers.  More 
importantly, Welch insists that the company actually lived the values, rewarding those who 
did so and punishing those who did not.  As he explains: “Every time we asked one of our 
high-performing managers to leave because he didn’t demonstrate the values – and we said 
as much publicly – the organization responded incredibly well.  In annual surveys over a 
decade, employees would tell us that we were a company that increasingly lived its values.  
That made people even more committed to living them too.  And as our employee 
satisfaction results improved, so did our financial results” (Welch, 2005, p. 21). 
2.4.2.2 Conclusions Drawn from the Values Literature 
At first glance some of the findings from the values literature appear contradictory.  















between espoused values, perceived values, and shared basic assumptions.  Griseri (1998) 
has pointed out that one’s deepest personal values are held at a subconscious level, and that 
people are often not aware of their own values.  Perceptions of corporate and individual 
values as determined by questionnaires and short interviews, or during employment 
interviews, are therefore more likely to refer to espoused corporate values and perceived 
personal values, than shared basic assumptions and deepest personal values, respectively.   
The pertinent findings from this section of the literature, from the point of view of 
management control and performance management, can be summarised as follows: 
 Organisational values held at the deepest level i.e. that of Schein’s (2004) shared 
basic assumptions, constitute the heart of culture and are difficult to discern and 
change. 
 It is possible to change employee behaviour by way of value-change programs driven 
by the leader.  Although the changed behaviour may be due to the adoption of 
espoused values which have been tested by the group and seen to work, positive 
behavioural change can nevertheless be achieved in this manner.  If the espoused 
values are seen to work on a regular basis over time, they can become entrenched 
as shared basic assumptions which will then form part of the group culture. 
 Both espoused values and deeply held assumptions can therefore exert a control 
effect, and can be influenced by management actions.  Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
contention that organisational culture cannot be manipulated should thus be 
questioned. 
 F&O’s framework does consider the ability of values to influence behaviour.  
Although F&O do not address values in their framework questions, in their 
guidelines to Question 1 they state that an organisation’s vision and mission form 
part of its beliefs systems, and as such embody core values and core purposes. 
F&O (p. 268) go on to say in their guideline that the purpose of framework Question 
1 is to “elicit information on how organisational values and purposes are established 
and communicated as a means of influencing the behaviour of organisational 
participants.”  F&O (p. 268) also highlight the need “to observe the impact that such 
processes have on the behaviour of managers at all levels”.  It is submitted that F&O 















deepest level of culture and may only be discerned after a considerable period of 
time and with some effort. 
F&O’s consideration of espoused values only, has certain implications for the 
analysis of an organisation’s controls via the use of F&O’s framework: 
(i) If espoused values are also held as shared basic assumptions, the application 
of F&O’s framework will not detect the influence of the shared basic 
assumptions on behaviour, and will be likely instead to attribute the control 
effect to the espoused values. 
(ii) Where shared basic assumptions are different from espoused values, the 
control effect of the shared basic assumptions is likely to go undetected. 
(iii) On the other hand, where espoused values have not been accepted by 
employees and do not influence employee behaviour, the lack of any control 
effect should be detected by F&O’s framework.  An explanation for the lack 
of any control effect would, however, not be forthcoming.  
It seems, then, that an apparent lack of understanding on the part of F&O of how 
values influence culture, can lead to erroneous interpretations of the effect of 
espoused values on employee behaviour.  This suggests that F&O’s framework 
should include a thorough interrogation of not only espoused values, but shared 
basic assumptions as well.  
 Individuals tend to seek employment with organisations whose espoused values 
match the indi iduals’ perceived personal values.  A good person-organisation fit 
may make such individuals more likely to exercise self-control in the pursuit of 
organisational objectives, or more likely to align themselves with group efforts to 
achieve organisational goals. 
A deliberate selection process which emphasises good person-organisation fit (i.e. a 
personnel control) could therefore facilitate cultural control, suggesting that 


















2.5 Clan Culture and Control 
The concepts of clan culture and clan control were first introduced into the social science 
control literature by the management writer Ouchi (1979), who set out to establish the 
control mechanisms by which an organisation can be managed so that it moves towards its 
objectives.  Ouchi (1979) also sought to determine how the design of these mechanisms 
could be improved, as well as the limits of each design. 
Ouchi’s thinking was influenced by work he had done with the parts distribution division of a 
major US company over a two-year period (Ouchi, 1979).  However, in his 1979 paper Ouchi 
also embarks upon a broader philosophical discussion of management control, using findings 
by other social scientists (e.g. Perrow, 1972) and examples from other industries to support 
and illustrate his conceptual framework.   
Ouchi (1979) proposes three mechanisms by which the employees of an organisation can be 
controlled: 
 A market mechanism, which accurately measures each person’s contribution.  This 
mechanism allows employees to pursue non-organisational goals, but at a loss of 
personal reward.  In reality, a market mechanism can rarely be employed. 
 A bureaucratic mechanism, which evaluates performance as closely as possible, and 
partly engenders feelings of commitment to the idea of legitimate authority in 
hierarchies. 
 A clan mechanism, which achieves organisational goals by selecting and socialising 
individuals, so that their individual objectives are largely congruent with those of 
the organisation. 
In the first instance, to explain clan control Ouchi uses the example of a foreman in the parts 
distribution company.  As the foreman’s task is to oversee the work of the pickers and 
packers, it is difficult for the warehouse manager to properly evaluate the foreman’s work 
other than through extensive surveillance.  An alternative would be for the warehouse 
manager to select for promotion to foreman only those workers who display a high internal 
commitment to the firm’s objectives.  If he can then maintain in them a deep commitment 
to achieving the ‘right’ objectives, he can eliminate many expensive forms of auditing and 















Ouchi explains that organisations can rely on selection and screening only to a certain 
extent.  To make up for the fact that they will not be able to find people who exactly fit their 
needs, organisations can employ training programmes to impart the desired skills and 
values.  However, training will not result in employees’ compliance due to their 
internalisation of underlying objectives and values.  Instead, this will occur because 
employees either identify with the trainer (who may be a respected superior), or with their 
work group or department (Ouchi, 1979). 
Ouchi also uses the example of a hospital to illustrate a clan-type mechanism.  He points out 
that health care employees undergo a highly formalised and lengthy period of socialisation, 
during which time they receive not only skills training, but also value training or 
indoctrination.  By the time that doctors and nurses qualify, they are qualified not only in 
respect of their technical capabilities, but also with respect to their ‘integrity or purity of 
values’ (Ouchi, 1979, page 837). 
When these socialisation processes characterise groups such as doctors or nurses who are 
employed in different organisations, but who hold similar values, we refer to these groups as 
professions.  When the socialisation process encompasses all of the citizens of a political 
unit, it is known as a culture.  And when the socialisation process refers to the properties of 
a unique organisation, we may refer to it as a clan.  Ouchi goes on to suggest that a clan may 
serve as the basis of control in some organizations, as long as certain prerequisites are in 
place (Ouchi, 1979). 
For a clan to exercise control there needs to be a deep level of common agreement between 
members as to what constitutes proper behaviour, as well as a high level of commitment to 
that behaviour.  Generally speaking, a control mode which relies on selecting the 
appropriate people can expect high commitment as a result of internalised values.  An 
organisation can therefore choose to be highly selective, employing only those individuals 
who have both the required skills and values which the organisation needs.  This practice is 
common, for instance, in hospitals, public accounting firms, and universities (Ouchi, 1979). 
Ouchi suggests that clan control may also be particularly relevant to those organisations 
where neither behaviour nor outputs can be easily controlled by bureaucratic or market 
methods.  An example would be the research laboratory of a large organisation.  In such 















desired scientific breakthroughs, and which in turn will result in new, marketable products.  
It may also take many years to evaluate the success of such products (Ouchi, 1979). 
The only alternative in this case may be to select suitably qualified and committed people, 
and then to engage in rituals and ceremonies which serve to reward those who display the 
underlying attitudes and values which are likely to lead to organisational success.  (In a 
research institution, rituals and ceremonies may include hazing new members in seminars 
[i.e. ragging them or giving them a testing time as a form of initiation], going to professional 
society meetings, and writing scientific articles for publication in academic journals) (Ouchi, 
1979). 
Ouchi goes on to suggest that in any organisation with high ambiguity, i.e. where means-
ends relationships are not well understood, such as in the public sector, in service industries, 
and in fast-growing technologies, cultural or clan forms of control are likely to be more 
appropriate than market or bureaucratic forms of control.  In simple language, if people are 
to engage in cooperative enterprises they must be able either to trust each other, or to 
closely monitor each other (Ouchi, 1979). 
In an almost prescient manner, Ouchi addresses what he sees to be the long-term problem 
besetting the control of organisations.  How, he asks, in a society that is becoming 
increasingly pluralistic and therefore goal-incongruent, and where economic organisations 
are characterised by increasing interdependence and ambiguity, may the control of 
organisations be achieved without recourse to unthinking bureaucratisation? (Ouchi, 1979).  
The answer may lie in a greater reliance on socio-ideological controls, as suggested by a 
growing number of researchers in recent times (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Sandelin, 2008; 
Collier, 2005). 
Whereas Ouchi makes a strong argument for the necessity of clan controls in organisations 
with high ambiguity, his reasons for clan formation are less convincing.  On the evidence of 
his 1979 paper, it appears more that Ouchi has identified a clan effect in certain 
organisations, but has not provided good reasons for the apparent cohesiveness of such 
clans. 
The questions remain: Can one successfully select suitably qualified and committed 
employees, and if not, how successful can socialisation and training be as a means of 
addressing shortcomings in the selection process?  Also, why do clan members continue to 















ceremonies, as suggested by Ouchi (1979), sufficient reward and motivation?  Ouchi 
provided answers to these questions over time, developing and expanding his theory of clan 
formation in two later conceptual papers, Ouchi (1980), and Wilkins and Ouchi (1983). 
2.5.1 Conceptual Changes to the Clan Concept: Ouchi (1980) 
In his 1980 paper Ouchi introduces a number of concepts not mentioned in his seminal 1979 
work to support the working of clan-type controls.  Using these concepts, Ouchi (1980) 
offers the following argument to support the formation of clans: 
 Cooperative action involves interdependence between individuals.  This 
interdependence requires a transaction or exchange in which each individual gives 
something of value (e.g. labour), and in return receives something of value (e.g. 
money). 
 Both individuals must regard the transaction as equitable – it must meet the 
standards of reciprocity which Gouldner (1961) has described as a universal 
requirement for collective life.  (A norm of reciprocity is one of only two social 
agreements that have been found to be universal among societies across time and 
cultures - the other is the agreement that incest is taboo [Gouldner, 1961, as cited 
by Ouchi, 1980].  Reciprocity is sometimes expressed in phrases such as ‘a fair day’s 
wage for a fair day’s work’). 
Ouchi points out that if no such norm of reciprocity existed, the costs of establishing 
a detailed contractual agreement to regulate the terms of exchange, and to audit 
the performance of the other party afterwards, would make the division of labour 
unthinkable and social existence impossible.  He concludes, therefore, that a norm 
of reciprocity underlies all exchange mechanisms.  
 It is the demand for equity (as described above) that gives rise to transaction costs.  
According to Ouchi, transaction costs present a solution to the problem of 
cooperation in the realm of economic activity. 
 A transaction cost is defined as: “Any activity which is engaged in to satisfy each 
party to an exchange, that the value given and received is in accord with his or her 















 Ouchi notes that equity can be difficult to determine in an environment which 
requires teamwork, since joint efforts produce a single outcome, and the input of 
each individual can be difficult to determine. 
 In a clan, then, cooperative effort can be attained by effecting changes in states of 
mind.  If the socialisation of individuals into an organisation is complete, therefore, 
the basis of reciprocity can be changed.  For example, Japanese firms rely largely on 
being able to hire inexperienced workers, socialising them to accept the company’s 
goals as their own, and compensating them according to non-performance criteria 
(such as length of service, or number of dependents). 
According to Ouchi it is not necessary for control purposes for Japanese 
organisations to measure the performance of their employees; the employees’ 
natural (socialised) inclination is to do what is best for the firm. 
 The normative requirements for clan formation are therefore: Reciprocity, 
[recognition of] legitimate authority, and common values and beliefs. 
The arguments advanced by Ouchi in his 1980 paper add to an understanding of the clan 
mechanism as introduced in his 1979 paper, but still appear to stumble at the final hurdle – 
the socialisation of employees to change their states of mind (i.e. their values), and thereby 
allow the basis of reciprocity to be changed. 
According to Griseri (1998) it is difficult to discern and change individuals’ deepest held 
values.  What is more, Ouchi’s example of Japanese firms may not be a good one as issues of 
national culture come into play as well. 
For example, Iyengar (2010, p.32) notes that: “Members of collectivist societies, including 
Japan, are taught to privilege the ‘we’ in choosing, and they see themselves primarily in 
terms of the groups to which they belong, such as family, co-workers, village, or nation.”  
Iyengar (2010, p. 33) goes on to say: “..the Japanese saying makeru ga kachi (literally ‘to lose 
is to win’) expresses the idea that getting one’s way is less desirable than maintaining peace 
and harmony....people in such societies then, strive to fit in and maintain harmony with their 
social in-groups.” 
This is in stark contrast with Western society, where since the Enlightenment of 17th and 18th 















conveyed by writers such as Adam Smith, who in 1776 argued that if each person pursued 
his own economic self-interest, society as a whole would benefit as if guided by an ‘invisible 
hand,’ and by the philosopher John Stuart Mill who in the 19th century wrote that “the only 
freedom deserving the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way...” (Iyengar, 
2010, p. 32). 
Japanese workers might therefore form clans based on the conditioning inculcated by their 
national culture, rather than on the socialisation process employed by the firm.  There is no 
guarantee either that employees in Western organisations will allow themselves to be 
socialised.  It would appear, then, that Ouchi’s 1980 paper still falls short of providing a 
convincing reason for the formation of clans in Western society. 
This is an important issue, and may be part of the reason why the idea of clan culture and 
the resultant control effects have not been more readily accepted in the management 
accounting literature.  Many of the references in the management accounting literature (as 
observed by this researcher) refer either to Ouchi’s 1979 and /or 1980 papers (e.g. Chenhall, 
2003; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Berry et al, 2009).  However, it 
will be argued below that it is only in later works (such as the paper co-authored with 
Wilkins in 1983) that Ouchi finally provides a convincing justification for all aspects of clan 
control. 
2.5.2 The Clan Concept Revisited: Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) 
Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) make the same points about transaction costs and reciprocity as in 
Ouchi (1980).  However, other concepts mentioned in the 1980 paper are modified and/or 
expanded, while certain new ideas are introduced.  Modifications, expansions and additions 
are as follows (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983): 
 The central problem of organisation (or governance of transactions) is stated as 
being that of determining how a perception of equity may be achieved amongst self-
interested people who are boundedly rational. 
 The clan is able to be efficient in governing transactions under conditions of 
relatively high uncertainty and complexity.  However, to do so it requires (i) 
relatively high levels of goal congruence, and (ii) the sharing of some general 















 ‘Goal congruence’ in this context does not mean that clan members and the 
organisation must have specific goals in common; it means instead that clan 
members tend to believe that in the long run they will be treated equitably.  This 
belief permits short-term inequities without destroying the clan relationship, and 
permits cooperative action even though specific equity cannot be determined. 
Two further underlying assumptions about goal congruence that must exist if clan 
control is to function are: (1) that joint effort is the best way to achieve individual 
self-interest; and (2) that in the long run both honest and dishonest people will be 
discovered and dealt with appropriately. 
 The term ‘paradigm’ means the sharing of general assumptions and values, as 
described by Kuhn (1970) with regard to scientific communities. 
 The way in which these two concepts result in cohesive clans is described as follows 
by Wilkins and Ouchi (1983, p. 471): “Thus the notion of goal congruence helps us 
understand the motivation of members to cooperate and work in the clan (a belief 
in the general equity of the association), and the paradigm suggests how members, 
once motivated, in general determine what is in the interest of the clan.  ....neither 
concept requires the assumption that clan members have specific goals in common.” 
 Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) suggest that some of the conditions conducive to clan 
formation are likely to be: 
- A reasonably long history and a reasonably stable membership (citing Schein, 
1981). 
- The telling of stories throughout the social group which were more often ‘shared 
stories’ that illustrated and legitimised a common management philosophy. 
- Considerable effort by management to screen applicants, to improve the 
likelihood that new members would already possess certain values and 
orientations in common with those promoted by the organisation. 
- A strong and shared claim of uniqueness, so that participants felt that their firm 
















- An atmosphere where many individuals are encouraged to offer opinions on 
decisions, rather than having decision-making dominated by single individuals. 
2.5.3 Empirical Evidence of Clan Controls 
A number of recent management control studies have found evidence of clan controls, and 
have identified the circumstances in which they are most appropriate and effective.  The 
first study to be reviewed illustrates these issues, but also suggests an interplay between 
clan controls and more formal control systems. 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) conducted a study of the control methods used in a Nordic 
subsidiary of a global management consultancy.  Using a case study approach, they 
examined specifically how different forms of technocratic control interacted and merged 
with socio-ideological controls.  Technocratic controls were described as attempts to directly 
control worker behaviour via plans, arrangements, and systems based on measurable 
outputs.  Socio-ideological controls, on the other hand, were considered to be those which 
affect behaviour indirectly, such as norms, emotions, beliefs and values. 
A key theme regarding the consultancy firm’s control processes was the high level of 
compliance achieved, even though this made strenuous demands on project team members 
(control being exercised at the team level).  Team members were required to work very long 
hours, and accept ambitious objectives in terms of project deadlines and project margins.  
The fact that they were prepared to do so contributed considerably to the financial success 
of the company. 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) found strong evidence of clan controls.  The consultancy 
applied selective recruitment and employed a highly homogenous work force, while 
socialisation and other ritualised, ceremonial forms of control were also in evidence. 
However, the researchers felt that there were also good reasons to emphasise the 
symbolism of the technocratic systems and procedures, as these drew attention to certain 
dimensions and also framed consciousness in a particular way.  They suggested that the 
company operated as a “technocratically framed clan” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, page 
442), and concluded that technocratic and socio-ideological controls should not be seen as 















Clan control appears to be the most appropriate form of control in what are known as 
knowledge-intensive firms (KIFs), a description that would almost certainly apply to the firm 
in the above-mentioned case study by Alvesson and Kärreman (2004).  KIFs are described as 
companies where most work is of an intellectual nature and where well-educated, qualified 
employees make up most of the workforce.  KIFs are also characterised by their capacity to 
solve complex problems by developing creative and innovative solutions (Robertson and 
Swan, 2003). 
Ditillo (2004) investigated the use of clan controls in a KIF.  Using a case study approach, he 
analysed the controls employed by three different software development teams in a 
knowledge-intensive IT firm.  The first team had to deal with issues of computational 
complexity, the second with issues of technical complexity, whereas the third group was 
required to develop a completely new product which required a great deal of innovation.  
This represented a situation of cognitional complexity, involving new processes for the staff 
involved.  It also entailed innovative problem solving, unknown outcomes, and potentially 
unexpected exceptions.  There was no strict deadline for the project, with completion dates 
being basically self-defined by the team members. 
It was found in the case of the third group that control was exercised by way of cultural and 
personnel controls.  The project manager acted more as a facilitator than as a manager, 
holding informal discussions with team members and monitoring progress, but otherwise 
staying out of people’s way and trusting the team of highly competent technical experts to 
‘get on with it’ (Ditillo, 2004, p. 415).  Implementation of personnel controls by the project 
manager involved his providing the necessary technical and other facilities for the project 
team, whereas cultural control was exerted by way of informal and intensive interaction and 
communication between team members (Ditillo, 2004). 
Ditillo (2004) uses Merchant’s (1998) ‘object of control’ framework to distinguish between 
results, action and personnel/cultural controls.  His finding that personnel and cultural 
controls were in place is almost a default position, after determining that results and action 
controls were not in use by the project team.  Ditillo (2004) describes personnel controls as 
being based on employees’ natural tendency to control themselves, and cultural controls as 
being based on the belief that by fostering a sense of solidarity and commitment towards 
















However, Ditillo (2004) makes no attempt to explain how this sense of solidarity and 
commitment is instilled in team members.  His description of the working environment 
(involving a high level of uncertainty) and the modus operandi of the team members suggest 
clan control, but despite citing Ouchi (1979), Ditillo (2004) prefers the vaguer umbrella term 
of cultural control.  One is again left with a sense that the researcher might not have an in-
depth appreciation of the workings of clan control. 
The final study in this section highlights the consequences of applying an inappropriate form 
of control where input/output relationships cannot easily be determined.  Although not an 
example of clan control as such, the findings have relevance for those environments best 
suited to clan-type controls. 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) note that professionally qualified employees are 
increasingly being employed in organisations where output controls are the norm.  However, 
according to most of the control literature, clan-type controls involving social and self 
control mechanisms are more appropriate in ‘professional’ environments.  This is because 
professionals undergo a lengthy training and socialisation process, and because their 
working environment is often characterised by unpredictable and complex work demands  
(Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995). 
In a study of 91 medical professionals employed in a Melbourne hospital, it was determined 
that individuals with a high professional orientation found output forms of control most 
offensive, i.e. where superiors imposed targets then measured performance against those 
targets.  However, where self-regulatory activities were not restricted, role conflict was 
reduced and individual job satisfaction and overall sub-unit performance were improved 
(Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995). 
2.5.4 Conclusions drawn from the Clan Control Literature 
The literature reviewed in this sub-section suggests that clan formation (and the resultant 
culture and control which ensue) can be explained by a theory which incorporates 
transaction costs, a norm of reciprocity which meets the required standards so that goal 
congruence is achieved, and the sharing of some general paradigm that helps to determine 
collective interest.  It should be noted that ‘goal congruence’ in this context is not to be 
understood as the sharing of common goals, but rather a belief by clan members that in the 















This theory obviates the need for specific common goals, and the changing of member 
values via a socialisation process.  It is, however, noted that the screening of applicants can 
help to foster clan cohesiveness, by identifying and employing those applicants with values 
and orientations which are aligned with those of the organisation. 
 It has also been established that, in KIFs and organisations or sub-units of organisations 
where conditions of high ambiguity prevail (i.e. where means-ends relationships are not well 
understood), clan forms of control are likely to be more appropriate and successful than 
technocratic forms of control.  However, the effects of technocratic controls operating in 
conjunction with clan controls should also be considered.  These effects can be both positive 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004) and negative (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995). 
It may also be significant that certain management accounting researchers do not appear to 
have fully engaged with socio-ideological forms of control such as personnel controls and 
clan controls.  For example, Malmi and Brown (2008) appear to have misunderstood 
personnel controls, confusing the means of implementing personnel controls with the 
controls themselves.   
Furthermore, in explaining the working of clan controls, Malmi and Brown (2008) refer only 
to Ouchi’s 1979 paper.  As suggested previously, it appears that Ouchi had only crystallised 
his thinking on clans some years later (e.g. Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983), and that the 1979 
conception of clan control appears to have identified an effect, but had not yet presented a 
plausible cause or causes for this effect.  This may have influenced the way in which clan 
controls have been understood, and the extent to which they have been accepted, in the 
management accounting literature. 
Ditillo (2004) has also looked no further than Ouchi’s seminal (1979) paper.  As a result his 
possibly incomplete knowledge of clan control, and his apparent neglect in not asking why or 
how cultural controls might foster a sense of solidarity and commitment towards the 
organisation’s goals, might have led him to fall short of a more meaningful interpretation of 
the case study scenario.  
Of some significance is the possibility that clan controls may be prevalent in modern, 
heterogeneous firms, and not just in KIF’s and other clan-type organisations.  Although 
Ouchi (1979) stated that the clan was not a feasible form of control in modern organisations 















questioned in the light of Wilkins and Ouchi’s (1983) paper, as well as other subsequent 
findings.  
For example, Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) suggest that the sharing of a common paradigm that 
determines collective interest will foster clan control.  Although this may seem more likely in 
a homogeneous, clan-like environment, modern heterogeneous organisations such as 
General Electric have developed values and thereby cultures which require employees to 
“act in a boundaryless fashion” thereby encouraging collaborative effort and the sharing of 
best practices across divisions and disciplines (Welch, 2005, p. 18).   
In a similar vein, Porter (1996) maintains that organisations obtain a competitive advantage 
not from increased operational effectiveness, but from the entire system of activities that 
they carry out.  He states that this requires the integration of decisions and actions across 
many independent sub-units.  Competitive companies do not, therefore, achieve success 
from individual strengths, core competencies, or critical resources, but from a list of 
strengths that cuts across many functions (Porter, 1996). 
It can also be argued that modern heterogeneous organisations achieve a high degree of 
homogeneity via the use of personnel controls, recruiting and retaining employees who 
share the same values as espoused by the organisation.  For example, during Welch’s tenure 
as CEO General Electric placed great emphasis on the human resources function, and also 
employed a 20/70/10 approach to personnel management (Welch, 2005).   
Based on an honest and transparent annual evaluation system, this involved the top 20% of 
employees being “showered with bonuses, stock options, praise, love, training, and a variety 
of rewards to their pocketbooks and souls” (Welch, 2005, p. 41).  The next 70% of employees 
were kept engaged and motivated by way of training, positive feedback, and thoughtful goal 
setting.  Finally, those who found themselves in the bottom 10% of employees were 
dismissed.  This ensured that, over time, the remaining employees were those who most 
readily bought into GE’s value system (Welch, 2005). 
It is entirely possible, therefore, that employees in modern organisations exercise a high 
degree of self-control in order to achieve organisational objectives.  They do so because of 
the clan effect, believing, because of an organisational culture that supports this belief, that 
collective efforts are the best way of ensuring corporate success.  They also believe that such 















Organisational writer Childs (2005) provides support for this view, pointing out that cultural 
control is in tune with the increasing numbers of professional and other knowledge workers 
in society.  Echoing the views of Ouchi (1979), he maintains that cultural control has long 
been applied within the professions, where it has combined with personal autonomy to 
follow strongly internalised norms of competence and correct conduct.  The rising 
proportion of knowledge workers is therefore establishing the need for a new approach to 
control that relies more heavily on internalised self-control (Child, 2005).   
Because of the established role of clan controls in homogeneous knowledge-intensive firms, 
and the possibility that clan controls may also be applied in modern heterogeneous 
organisations, it is important that Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework be able to detect 
this form of control.  The extent to which it can do so will be an important test of the 
adequacy and robustness of the framework, and will help to address the second objective of 
this study. 
2.6 Culture as a Paradigm: The Implications for Cultural Change, Management Control and 
Performance Management 
One of the reasons advanced by Ferreira and Otley (2009) for the exclusion of culture from 
their evaluative framework is that culture is difficult to change.  The reasons for such 
difficulty will be examined in this section.  This will allow for a more critical analysis of the 
cultural change literature, which follows in a later section. 
It also appears that the paradigmatic nature of culture might have implications for 
management control systems and performance management systems.  These issues will be 
identified and discussed in this section.   
2.6.1 The Nature of Cultural Paradigms and the Implications for Cultural Change 
A number of influential writers in the field of culture (per Hughes, 2010) have examined the 
effects of the paradigmatic nature of culture (e.g. Schein, 2004; Johnson, 1992).  The term 
“paradigm” has been described in a number of ways.  Senge (1995, p. 102) describes a 
paradigm as “the prevailing motivations and assumptions held (and generally unvoiced) by 
people.”  Kuhn (1996, p.175), in discussing the structure of scientific revolutions, refers to a 
paradigm as “...the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by 















In similar fashion Johnson (1992, page 29) cites Schein’s (1986) definition of culture in 
describing the cultural paradigm as “the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that 
are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously and define in a basic 
‘taken for granted’ fashion an organisation’s view of itself and its environment.”  It is also 
seen as important to ensure the success of the organisation.  As a result, the diverse and 
often confusing signals that the organization faces are made sense of and filtered in terms of 
this paradigm. 
Johnson developed his explanatory model by addressing the resistance to change exhibited 
by executive teams required to make drastic revisions to their business strategy in response 
to environmental changes.  He notes that much strategic change occurs gradually, and is 
shaped by the existing cultural paradigm.  He refers to this as ‘logical incrementalism.’  This 
can be beneficial if the paradigm encompasses the special competences and skills of the 
organisation, and the means by which it could expect to achieve a competitive advantage.  
However, it can lead to serious strategic problems if the organisation is faced with significant 
internal and/or external change (Johnson, 1992). 
Part of the resistance to change that occurs in organisations is due to the fact that the 
paradigm is hedged about and protected by a web of cultural artefacts.  These artefacts 
correspond largely to those described earlier by Schein (2004), and serve to provide a 
template for the way members respond to given situations, and determine ‘the way we do 
things around here.’  Because the most powerful managerial grouping in the organisation is 
likely to be most closely associated with the key constructs of the paradigm, the action of 
organisational life is going to be bound to the paradigm by the web of cultural artefacts 
(Johnson, 1992). 
When faced with pressure for change, managers are likely to respond in ways which are in 
line with the prevailing paradigm.  This causes real difficulties when the strategic change 
required is outside the scope of the paradigm, as managers are now required to substantially 
change their core beliefs and modes of operation.  Case study evidence gathered from a 
number of different organisations suggests that this does not happen easily (Johnson, 1992). 
Although Johnson (1992) does not acknowledge the influence of Kuhn’s writings on his 
theory of cultural paradigms, it is interesting to note the similarities in their respective 
approaches to major change.  Kuhn (1970, 1996) notes that scientific communities also 















Kuhn (1996) points out that most successful scientific progress is incremental, adding little 
by little to the body of existing knowledge.  However, scientific progress also displays a non-
cumulative or revolutionary mode.  This occurs when an anomaly arises which cannot 
satisfactorily be explained by the existing paradigm.  After some time the existing paradigm 
is discarded, to be replaced by a competing paradigm. 
It is significant to note that, when a competing paradigm is introduced, scientists do not 
generally abandon the paradigm responsible for the crisis.  At first they attempt to modify or 
articulate the existing theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.  The new paradigm 
is only accepted after considerable turmoil within the scientific community.  It is also 
important to note that the transition from the old paradigm to the new is not a cumulative 
process.  It is a reconstruction of the field from new principles, resulting in a fundamental 
change in methods and applications (Kuhn, 1996). 
So, because of the considerable psychosocial difficulties encountered by groups in making 
such ‘paradigm shifts,’ scientific revolutions are strongly resisted by those who are wedded 
to the existing paradigm.  In the same way, organisational groups resist radical change which 
requires the adoption of a new cultural paradigm, as described by Johnson (1992).  
It is interesting to note that Kuhn’s (1996) distinction between incremental change within an 
existing paradigm, and drastic or revolutionary change requiring a new paradigm, parallels 
Johnson’s (1992) theory of strategic change.  The resistance to such change is also noted by 
both men. 
Inasmuch as Kuhn’s (1996) observations reflect aspects of human group behaviour (albeit in 
a different field), the fact that they support the findings and views of both Johnson (1992) 
and Schein (2004) would appear to give further credence to the influence of cultural 
paradigms on organisational group behaviour, and to their explanatory power with regard to 
behavioural change (and particularly the resistance thereto) by groups.  
Whereas Johnson (1992) notes the effect of cultural paradigms, Schein (2004) provides an 
explanation of how and why paradigms are formed, and of how this fosters our 
understanding of the difficulties surrounding cultural change.  Schein (2004) explains that all 
human systems attempt to maintain equilibrium and maximize their autonomy in relation to 
their environment.  The set of shared assumptions, which develop over time in groups and 















The evolution of culture is therefore one of the ways in which a group or organisation 
maintains its integrity and autonomy.  Culture also allows a group or organisation to 
differentiate itself from the environment and other groups, and to provide itself with an 
identity.  This explains why cultural change can be difficult to achieve; what the group has 
learnt has become embedded in various routines, and may have become part of the 
personal and group identity.  As a result even some dysfunctional behaviour by group 
members may be difficult to give up, as the required change may make members lose group 
membership, or may violate some aspect of their identity (Schein, 2004). 
Despite the resistance to change which results from the existence of a cultural paradigm, 
many writers believe nevertheless that cultural change can be achieved.  These claims will 
be examined in Section 2.7 of this study. 
2.6.2 The Cultural Paradigm: Implications for Management Control Systems and 
Performance Management Systems 
As noted above, management control systems play a role in the functioning of the cultural 
paradigm.  Johnson (1992) sees management control systems as part of a web of cultural 
artefacts, which serves to bind the actions of the organisation to the cultural paradigm.  
Schein (2004), on the other hand, suggests that organisations develop management control 
systems as part of the process by which the managing coalition addresses its survival in, and 
adaptation to, its external environment.  Schein (2004) explains that the systems which 
emerge become central elements of the organisation’s culture, as consensus develops 
around the criteria the organisation chooses and the systems it develops to measure itself. 
It seems therefore that management control systems help to shape culture, and are 
themselves shaped by the emergent attitudes and beliefs of the managing coalition.  As 
cultural artefacts, they help to strengthen the cultural paradigm and also represent the 
superficial level of an organisation’s culture.  Their cultural meaning will depend upon the 
way in which they are perceived by insiders (Hofstede, 1990). 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) accept that culture is an important contingent variable.  They 
believe that culture might provide insights into why certain patterns of control are more or 
less effective, but seem not to envisage culture shaping control system choice and design in 
any meaningful way.  This may be an important oversight, as it may not be possible to fully 
















The idea of culture as a paradigm may also require the re-thinking of the contingency theory 
of control.  Contingency theory suggests that certain contextual variables have an influence 
on control systems design and use.  The literature has identified these variables as external 
environment, strategy, national culture, organisational structure, size, technology, and 
ownership structure (Chenhall, 2003). 
However, what the contingency theory literature has not recognised is that in many 
instances (e.g. external environment, strategy, organisational structure, ownership 
structure) it is perhaps not the effect of the contingent variable that should be considered, 
but rather the effect of the managing coalition’s view of that variable, as filtered through the 
lens of its particular cultural paradigm. 
To maintain the relevance of management control system contingency-based research, 
Chenhall (2003) has suggested that, among other issues, much can be gained by reflecting 
on the more recent thinking in areas such as organisational and cultural change.  The issues 
discussed above would certainly appear to support that view.  
With regard to performance management, Johnson’s (1992) and Schein’s (2004) conceptual 
frameworks could also have implications for strategic management models such as the 
balanced scorecard, and for performance management frameworks such as that of Ferreira 
and Otley (2009).  Such models assume that, if the strategy being implemented is not 
bringing about the desired financial results, such strategy can be amended, or even 
discarded and replaced with a new strategy (Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Kaplan and Norton, 
2001). 
If the nature of the strategic change is incremental and can be filtered through the existing 
paradigm, it would appear to have a greater chance of success.  However, if the replacement 
strategy needs to be revolutionary, requiring a paradigm shift in response to significant 
environmental changes, this may be a lot more difficult to achieve.  This reality does not 
appear to have been recognised in the performance management literature. 
2.7 Managing Cultural Change  
For over three decades, writers on organisational culture have suggested that by managing 
their cultures, organisations can improve their performance (Handy, 1978; Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982).  This notion has more recently been 















confronting the persistent pattern of behaviour that is blocking the organisation from higher 
performance, diagnosing its consequences, and identifying the underlying assumptions and 
values that have created it.”  However, even Beer acknowledges that about 70% of all 
change initiatives fail, and that most change programmes do not deliver benefits 
proportional to the resources devoted to them (Beer and Nohria, 2000). 
In reviewing the literature over the past 30 years, Hughes (2010) notes that the wave of 
populist cultural change literature launched during the 1980s and early 1990s has not been 
sustained.  Deal and Kennedy, after almost twenty years of exposure to cultural change 
initiatives, expressed this most succinctly in 1999: “There must be a million consultants 
promising to help ‘change the cultures’ of companies.  What a lot of bollocks” (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1999, p. 35). 
Alvesson (2002a) notes that the most popular view of cultural change among those who 
believe it to be possible, is the view of change as a large-scale technocratic project.  Such a 
view suggests the possibility of an intentional transformation from a less desirable cultural 
situation to a superior and more profitable one.  It is generally acknowledged, though, by the 
proponents of these change models that such change is not easy and takes place slowly (e.g. 
Kotter, 1996; Beer, 2000). 
 
Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) note that there is no successful recipe for large-scale 
organisational culture change.  The reasons why cultural change might be difficult were set 
out earlier in the explanatory models of Johnson (1992), Kuhn (1996), and Schein (2004), and 
are reinforced by the above-mentioned objections gleaned from the literature. 
The message which emerges from the literature (and in particular, the change management 
literature) is that culture is not a variable which can easily be manipulated by management 
to enhance organisational performance.  To even speak of a homogeneous organisational 
culture may be misguided, as almost every organisation (except perhaps the very smallest) is 
likely to be made up of various different sub-cultures.  The notion of a homogeneous 
organisational culture may exist, then, more as a perception of senior management than as a 
reality (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). 
What then of managing culture as a means of control?  Johnson and Gill (1993) contend that 
it may be possible if organisation is seen to rest in shared systems of meaning.  They explain 















action suggested, managers being symbolic actors who foster desirable patterns of meaning.  
However, when we look at the processes by which this may be achieved, we are looking at a 
much more demanding, subtle and democratic activity on the part of management than the 
literature suggests”  (Johnson and Gill, 1993, p. 110).   
Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) also maintain that the management of meaning via 
everyday reframing of employees’ views is a means of achieving incremental change in local 
groups within the organisation.  They concur with Johnson and Gill (1993) that this is not an 
easy process, demanding creativity, stamina, and insights into one’s own beliefs, values and 
ideas.  It may also involve compromises, e.g. if one wishes to engender creativity and 
learning, then quality and short-term efficiency may have to be sacrificed as new ideas and 
experimentation are likely to involve some errors and additional resources (Alvesson and 
Sveningsson, 2008). 
Schein (2004) agrees with but expands upon the beliefs of Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008), 
and Johnson and Gill (1992), to suggest that the creation and management of culture is 
uniquely associated with leadership.  Despite acknowledging the difficulty of changing an 
entrenched culture, Schein (2004) nevertheless contends that the dynamic processes of 
culture creation and management are the essence of leadership; that leadership and culture 
are in fact two sides of the same coin. 
Schein (2004) believes that founders, as well as subsequent leaders of the organisation, have 
certain primary embedding mechanisms available to them, with which they embed their 
beliefs, values and assumptions.  These beliefs, values and assumptions are based on the 
founder’s and leaders’ own conscious and unconscious convictions.  Primary embedding 
mechanisms include (but are not limited to) what leaders pay attention to, measure and 
control; how leaders react to critical incidents and organisational crises; how they allocate 
resources; how they allocate rewards and status; and how they recruit, select, promote and 
excommunicate (Schein, 2004). 
Leaders also employ certain secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms.  These 
involve artefacts such as organisational design and structure, organisational systems and 
procedures, organisational rites and rituals, stories about important events and people, and 
formal statements of organisational philosophy, creeds, and charters (Schein, 2004, p. 246). 
Schein advises that an important aspect of the above-mentioned mechanisms is that they 















not to communicate; they can, however, choose the extent to which they manage this 
communication (Schein, 2004). 
Schein (2004) explains that self-guided evolution can also result in cultural change as the 
organisation matures, and its members come to better understand the organisation’s 
cultural strengths and weaknesses.  These insights can allow the leader to steer cultural 
change in the desired direction, which can in turn be achieved by applying the appropriate 
embedding mechanisms mentioned earlier. 
There is considerable support in the literature for managed incremental cultural change, as 
described by Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008), Johnson and Gill (1992), and Schein (2004).  
For example, Jazayeri and Scapens (2008) describe how British aerospace company BAE 
achieved a six-fold improvement in share price some five years after implementing a major 
cultural change programme.  Appointed CEO of BAE in 1990, Sir Richard Evans launched the 
change program in 1994 in response to serious competitive pressures which threatened the 
company’s long-term existence. 
As champion of the change process, Evans noted that “...unless the need for change freely 
emerges out of honest and open discussion, deep-seated transformation will never 
occur....since the goal was to change behaviour, we had to deploy group and peer pressure 
to achieve [this] purpose.  So I looked for a balance: neither hurrying the process, nor letting 
it take too long” (Evans and Price, 1999, p. 28, as cited by Jazayeri and Scapens, 2008, p. 57).   
Although Jazayeri and Scapens (2008) note that the eventual financial success of BAE cannot 
be ascribed solely to the cultural change programme, opinion within the company was that 
it had played a significant part in this success. 
Sir Brian Pitman found himself in a similar position to Evans when in 1983 he became CEO of 
Lloyds Bank in the UK.  At the time Lloyds had a culture where annual increases were based 
on inflation rather than merit, and a growth strategy which had resulted in more than half of 
Lloyds’ businesses earning a return below their cost of capital.  Shortly after being appointed 
to his post as CEO, Pitman launched what was to become a successful value-based 
management programme at Lloyds (Pitman, 2003). 
As Pitman soon learnt, value-based management involved more than the application of a 
new performance metric or accounting method; it required the transformation of 
employees’ beliefs (Pitman, 2003).  Reshaping Lloyds also met with considerable resistance 















years.  Transforming the company required Pitman to lead employees on a journey of 
learning, a journey which provided new insights into the means by which shareholder value 
could be created (Pitman, 2003, p. 46).  
This is very much in line with Alvesson and Sveningsson’s (2008) contention that incremental 
change in local groups within the organisation can be achieved via the everyday reframing of 
employees’ views.  Other writers have also emphasised the role of managers who play an 
educational role as part of the change process.  For example, Lawrence et al (2006, p. 64) 
note that: “The work of educators is perhaps the most overlooked.  ......educators often 
depend on subtlety, leading others to work in ways that indirectly shift their perceptions and 
understandings.”   
2.7.1 Conclusions Regarding the Cultural Change Literature 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) have conceded that management actions may influence some 
aspects of culture, and that it might therefore be appropriate to include culture in a wider 
performance management systems framework. 
The findings from the cultural change literature appear to support this view.  Although large-
scale cultural change programmes have met with limited success, there is evidence from the 
literature that the actions of leaders and managers can achieve incremental cultural change 
over time. 
This can be understood in the context of cultural change and the nature of the cultural 
paradigm, as discussed earlier.  A large-scale challenge to the prevailing paradigm (i.e. of the 
magnitude to require a ‘paradigm shift’) is more than likely to be met with strong resistance 
and even rejection (Johnson, 1992).  However, where change can be achieved incrementally, 
via a journey of learning which leads to a change in employees’ beliefs (i.e. a changed 
paradigm), cultural change is indeed possible.  The various embedding mechanisms available 
to leaders, as mentioned by Schein (2004), are also likely to be more efficacious if employed 
over a period of time. 
It is also apparent from the literature that cultural change effected by managers can result in 
improved organisational performance.  The overall findings of this sub-section therefore 
serve to support the claim that culture as a control variable deserves to be included in 



































This chapter identifies and justifies the research paradigm applicable to this study, as well as 
the research method employed.  Methods of data collection and data analysis are also 
presented.  Finally, the limitations of the study are discussed.   
3.2 Research Paradigm 
This study sets out to determine and evaluate the formal and informal methods of 
management control and performance management employed by a small South African 
consulting company during 2006/2007.  To this end the two main research paradigms were 
considered, which according to Hussey and Hussey (1997) can be labelled positivist and 
phenomenological. 
Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 48) suggest that it is best to regard the positivist and 
phenomenological paradigms as two extremes of a continuum, with the characteristics and 
assumptions of one paradigm being gradually relaxed and replaced by those of the other as 
one moves along the continuum.  To appreciate and justify the approach taken in this study, 
the characteristics and assumptions of both the positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
will now be examined. 
As applied in the social sciences, the positivistic approach seeks the facts or causes of social 
phenomena, with little consideration for the subjective state of the individual.  Logical 
reasoning is applied to the research, with precision, objectivity and rigour replacing 
experience and intuition as the means of investigating research problems.  The positivistic 
viewpoint sees laws as providing the basis of explanation, with both the natural and social 
worlds being bound by certain fixed laws in a sequence of cause and effect.  Positivists 
believe that social scientists can adopt the role of observers of an independent and pre-
existing reality; they should remain distant when conducting their research and not allow 
values and bias to distort their objective views (Hussey and Hussey, 1997, p. 52). 
Phenomenology, on the other hand, is the science of phenomena, with a phenomenon being 















cause is uncertain (Allen, 1990, p. 893).  The phenomenological paradigm emerged in 
reaction to the positivistic paradigm, and is concerned with understanding human behaviour 
from the participant’s own frame of reference.  It assumes that social reality is within us, and 
that the act of investigating reality therefore has an effect on that reality.  Phenomenology is 
a qualitative approach which emphasises the subjective aspects of human activity by 
focussing on the meaning rather than the measurement of social phenomena (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997, p. 52 & 53). 
The research methods used under this approach encompass a variety of interpretative 
techniques which look to describe, translate and generally come to terms with the meaning 
rather than the frequency of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the 
social world (Van Maanen, 1983, p. 9).  The methods differ from the positivist approach in 
that they involve the study of direct experience taken at face value, and regard behaviour as 
being determined by the phenomena of experience rather than by external, objective, and 
physically described reality (Cohen and Manion, 1987).  Lofland and Lofland (1984, p. 1) have 
also referred to phenomenological research as that which uses the data collection 
techniques of particular observation and/or intensive interviewing, and data analysis 
techniques that are non-quantitative. 
In this study both positivist and phenomenological methods have been applied, for the 
following reasons:  In the first instance, Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) evaluative framework 
was used to identify the management control systems in place in the case study company.  
This framework was developed inductively over some years, based on the relevant literature 
and on the authors’ observations and research experience (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 263 
&264).  
As far as identifying the organisation’s technocratic controls was concerned, a deductive or 
positivist approach was required, relying on the logical application of Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) criteria.  [Technocratic controls are those controls intended to exert a direct influence 
on output and behaviour (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004)].  Ferreira and Otley in effect 
hypothesise that their framework will be able to identify the management control and 
performance management issues in an organisation.  The deductive application of their 
framework tested this hypothesis as far as the identification of technocratic controls was 















The identification of socio-ideological controls, however, called for a different approach.  
[Socio-ideological controls are those controls intended to influence the minds of employees 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004)].  Ferreira and Otley (2009) acknowledge that their 
framework does not address cultural controls, a criticism that has also been levelled by 
various other researchers (e.g. Collier, 2005).  In seeking to determine whether cultural and 
other associated socio-ideological controls were employed in the case study company, the 
actions, values and behaviours of the case study employees had to be qualitatively assessed 
and evaluated by the researcher over a period of months.  This required ongoing 
observation, in-depth interviews, and a qualitative evaluation of the data, i.e. a 
phenomenological approach to data gathering and analysis.   
3.3 Research Method 
The case study method has been employed in this study.  It has been suggested that the case 
study methodology is a research strategy for the social scientist in a similar sense as 
experiments are a research strategy for the natural scientist (Smith, 1990).  It has been 
defined by Yin (1994, p. 13) as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”  Yin goes on to describe it as being an 
appropriate form of research when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions have to be asked, when no 
control is required over behavioural events, and when a focus on contemporary events is 
required (Yin, 1994). 
This study meets all three requirements; ‘how’ questions have been asked in respect of the 
means of control achieved by the case study company, and ‘why’ questions have tested the 
appropriateness of the methods employed (with reference to the literature).  The setting of 
the case study is a contemporary one, and the researcher has been an observer of events 
and (to a far lesser degree) a participant therein, but has not needed to, or attempted to, 
control events.  The exact levels of involvement by the researcher are spelt out in more 
detail in the data collection section (3.4) below.  
The philosophy behind the case study method recognises that, at times, a full picture of the 
actual interaction of variables or events can only be obtained by looking carefully at a 
practical, real life instance.  The case study allows the investigator to concentrate on specific 
instances in an attempt to identify detailed interactive processes which may be crucial, but 















therefore, is to provide a three-dimensional picture of the situation.  It can illustrate 
relationships, corporate political issues and patterns of influence in a particular context 
(Remenyi, 1996). 
This research is based on a single case study.  Yin (1994) explains that criticism of the single 
case study approach is based on the proposition that one cannot generalise the findings 
from a single case study.  However, as he points out, case studies are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes.  The case study does 
therefore not represent a sample, and the researcher’s goal is to “expand and generalise 
theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalisation)” (Yin, 1994, p. 10).  Citing Lipset, Trow and Coleman, (1956, p. 419/420), Yin 
(1994, p. 10) quotes these social scientists as saying that their goal in using a single case 
study was to conduct a generalising rather than a particularising analysis. 
The single case study approach has also been recognised in the management accounting 
literature as being the desired approach to field research.  Ittner and Larcker (2001, p. 396) 
note that: “Greater use of detailed data from a single or small number of organisations is 
also recommended.  Although small sample studies will always be subject to complaints 
about their generalisability, such studies may provide the only means for obtaining the 
quantity and level of data needed to answer many management accounting questions.” 
Otley (2001) goes so far as to claim that the single case study is the best method for 
investigating management control and performance management issues.  In his view, field-
based methods are most likely to pick up on the wide variety of control mechanisms used in 
practice, and also to firmly ground the development of theory in empirically observed 
practice.  This is not to suggest that all practice should uncritically be accepted as 
appropriate; however, such an approach will allow for the observed effects of different 
practices in different circumstances to be documented.  Any inductively generated theory 
that evolves from such work can then be subjected to further testing and development. 
A single case study approach is deemed appropriate for this study, for the reasons 
mentioned previously by Yin (1994), Ittner and Larcker (2001), and Otley (2001).  It is also 
significant that the case study organisation to be studied is of a particular type, i.e. a 
knowledge-intensive firm.  The literature suggests that, in such firms, socio-ideological forms 
of control are most appropriate (Swan and Robertson, 2003).  What is more, the evaluative 















applied to the case study company, has been criticised for not recognising socio-ideological 
controls.  The use of a single knowledge-intensive firm therefore allows for the 
appropriateness of socio-ideological controls in knowledge-intensive firms to be examined, 
as well as the completeness of the evaluative framework being applied. 
3.4 Data Collection  
Data collection occurred over an initial twelve-month period between April 2006 and March 
2007.  During this time the researcher was employed as an in-house consultant by the 
holding company of which the case study organisation was a subsidiary.  The consultancy 
required the implementation of a performance management system throughout the group, 
a diversified holding company.  The case study company, which had been newly acquired, 
was acknowledged to have an excellent CEO and superior management control systems in 
place, and the researcher’s brief was to familiarise himself with these systems with a view to 
evaluating and adapting them if necessary before rolling them out throughout the group. 
The researcher approached the case study organisation with the intention of carrying out 
the consultancy brief, but also with the intention of gathering data for this study.  However, 
not being acquainted with the CEO or management team, at the initial stage the academic 
study was not mentioned.  Data was gathered on the basis that it might be used for an 
academic case study at a later stage should permission be granted.  (This possibility was 
however discussed and agreed up-front with the CEO of the holding company, who 
advocated this approach). 
Adler and Adler’s (1987) taxonomy of field research methods was then considered in order 
to determine the appropriate level of researcher involvement in the case study.  Adler and 
Adler’s (1987) taxonomy presents a continuum of researcher involvement, from observing 
members at one end of the scale to complete membership of the observed organisation at 
the other.  Three research traditions are represented; “The Chicago School of Sociology,” 
“Existential Sociology,” and “Ethnomethodology.”  The characteristics of each are: 
 The Chicago School – Involvement increases from observing members, to interacting 
with members, to participating with members. 
 Existential Sociology – Involves investigative participation 
 Ethnomethodology – In the extreme case, this requires a deep commitment to the 















and taking on the obligations and engaging in the activities just as any fully-fledged 
member would do. 
Ethnomethodology, while similar in approach to existential sociology, was regarded as being 
too extreme for the type of study being conducted.  As ethnomethodology requires the 
researcher to become a complete member of the organisation, taking on obligations and 
engaging in activities as fully-fledged members would do, there was thought to be a greater 
danger that the researcher might influence the environment of the study.  The nature of the 
consultancy brief also rendered this approach impracticable. 
Advocates of The Chicago School suggest that the researcher adopt an overt role and 
acknowledge to organisational members that they are conducting a study.  The researcher 
should also, over time, participate fully in organisational activities.  This approach was 
rejected for two reasons: as with ethnomethodology, it was feared that emotional 
detachment might be difficult if the researcher were to participate fully in organisational 
activities.  Also, as mentioned previously, as it had been decided not to mention the 
academic study at first, it would not be possible to advise the organisation’s members that a 
study was being conducted. 
The third option, existential sociology, seemed viable.  This involves investigative 
participation, which posits that people in organisations present two sides of their behaviour 
and activities.  One side is presented to outsiders, while another is presented to insiders.  To 
overcome this, investigative participation urges researchers to shed their objective 
detachment and become an insider to the organisation (Adler and Adler, 1987). 
Researchers are also encouraged to develop relationships with organisational members, so 
as to gather information and draw on members’ subjective experiences.  Unlike the Chicago 
School, investigative participation recommends that researchers use a combination of overt 
and covert roles to maximise the amount and kinds of information and insight they gather 
(Adler and Adler, 1987).  As this seemed to best describe the role which the researcher 
would, due to circumstances, be required to fulfil (and due as well to its methodological 
soundness), an approach of investigative participation was adopted. 
Data on management control systems (including appropriate and detailed supporting 
documents and reports) were gathered by way of formal meetings with the CEO of the case 
study company (“Business Intelligence Company,” hereafter referred to as “BIC”), and by 















latter meetings were attended by the full management team, comprising the CEO, the 
branch managers of the Cape Town and Durban branches, the national sales manager, two 
technical managers (one from the Johannesburg head office, and one from Cape Town), and 
the financial manager.  Most of the formal meetings were recorded, with all relevant data 
being transcribed afterwards by the researcher. 
Minutes of meetings, PowerPoint slide presentations, monthly management accounts, and 
other supporting documentation were all made available to the researcher.  Management 
was asked to cooperate fully with the researcher, and telephonic and email queries were 
entertained and generally responded to promptly and comprehensively by members of the 
management team.  Together with notes made and transcribed by the researcher, this 
represented a comprehensive data base of relevant material.  
Apart from observation by the researcher and interviews with all members of the 
management team during 2006/2007, supplementary data on organisational culture was 
also gathered from the management team by way of e-mailed questionnaires (employing 
both closed and open-ended questions), followed up where necessary by telephone calls 
(Some of these occurred in 2011, prior to the writing-up of this report, to clarify certain 
issues which had not been anticipated during 2006/2007).  Notes were taken of telephone 
conversations and were later transcribed by the researcher. 
Informal interviews were held on various occasions with certain of BIC’s BI consultants, all of 
whom were chosen on a random basis.  However, the selection was made from the 
population of consultants who had been with the company for at least three years.  This is in 
line with the approach taken by Alvesson and Kärreman (2004), who note that it follows 
what in the ethnographic vocabulary is labelled as “studying up”: focussing, in relative terms, 
on experienced employees rather than those who have been more recently recruited. 
An in-depth telephonic interview was also conducted with a senior BI consultant with over 
ten years’ experience with the company.  Details of these interviews were transcribed as 
soon after the interviews as possible.  Most of the data on culture was collected between 
October 2006 and March 2007, once permission to use BIC as the basis of an academic case 

















3.5 Data Analysis 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework has been used to both present and analyse the 
management control and performance management data.  This provides a convenient 
organising structure, and is also appropriate in that it simultaneously allows for a critical 
evaluation of the completeness of the framework.  The simultaneous presentation and 
analysis of data is regarded as an acceptable approach in a phenomenological study, as it is 
often impossible to disentangle the results and the analysis (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Cultural data has been presented and analysed with reference to the various aspects of 
culture as identified in the literature (Hofstede, 1990; Ouchi, 1982; Schein, 2004), and by 
applying the cultural analysis techniques advocated by Johnson (1992) and Schein (2004). 
3.6 Limitations of the Study 
There is a danger, particularly in the early stages of data gathering, that BIC employees were 
trying to create an impression rather than relay the facts as they perceived them (Young, 
1999).  However, as BIC employees became used to the researcher’s presence over time, this 
effect diminished to a large extent if not completely.  Also, the same data was gathered from 
a number of different participants over different periods of time as a means of data 
triangulation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  This should have lessened the effects of any 
(conscious or unconscious) attempts at “impression management” (Young, 1999). 
As far as the collection of cultural data is concerned, Johnson (1992) has indicated that a 
cultural audit undertaken with the assistance of a firm’s senior management can serve to 
identify the cultural paradigm within which the organisation operates.  It is also implied that 
this is not necessarily a lengthy process. 
However, Schein (2004) illustrates by way of a case study based on his consultancy 
experience that deeply-held assumptions do not always yield to short-term investigation.  It 
is possible, therefore, that certain aspects of BIC’s culture were not uncovered during the 
research process. 

















Data Collection and Analysis 
 
4.1 Purpose of the Study 
This study seeks to determine whether socio-ideological controls, such as organisational 
culture, clan controls, and personnel controls should be included in Ferreira and Otley’s 2009 
PMS template, designed to identify the major control and performance management issues 
within an organisation.   
As certain elements of the management control literature suggest that Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) framework is deficient to the extent that it ignores socio-ideological controls, a case 
study has been conducted on a small knowledge-intensive consulting firm in South Africa.  
Shortcomings in the Ferreira and Otley (2009) framework with regard to socio-ideological 
control should become evident by: 
 applying Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework to determine the controls and 
performance management systems employed by the firm; 
 qualitatively assessing the socio-ideological controls applied within the firm, in the 
light of the findings from the social science, organisational management, and 
management control literature reviewed in the previous chapter. 
The above-mentioned qualitative assessment should allow for the achievement of the 
ultimate objective of this study, i.e. a critical re-evaluation of the robustness and adequacy 
of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework, with particular regard to its possible non-inclusion 
of socio-ideological controls.   
4.2 Background to the Case Study 
The name of the case study company in this study has been disguised, and is referred to as 
“BI Company” (BIC).  Management and staff are referred to by acronyms which reflect their 
job titles. 
BIC is a small South African company which provides Business Intelligence consultancy and 
training services.  Software licence sales and annual software licence fees made up the 
balance of the company’s revenue streams at the time of the case study.  The company was 















BIC was badly managed by its new owner, and many of the skilled staff resigned during the 
first two years under the new regime.  In 2001 the company was purchased by a consortium 
of private equity investors, at which time a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) was appointed.  
An experienced professional manager with many years of industry experience, CEO had to 
implement policies, procedures and controls at BIC, as these were generally lacking.  The 
company was not earning an adequate return on investment, another issue which had to be 
addressed with some urgency.  Scant attention had been paid to strategy, while staff skills 
and competencies were below the required levels in some areas.  What is more, staff did not 
trust management and morale was low.  CEO turned his attention to all of these issues. 
In 2002 BIC’s annual turnover was in the region of R12 million.  Having re-structured his 
management team, instituted a profit sharing and incentive scheme, put in place the 
appropriate (in his view) systems, procedures and controls, and strengthened his team of 
consultants, CEO embarked on a growth strategy.   
This was based primarily on the growth of services revenues, particularly in long-term 
contracts, in recognition of the fact that margins on software licence sales and annual 
licence fees were likely to be reduced in the nearby future by BIC’s vendor.  A good service 
reputation had in the past led to BIC consultants being regarded as trusted advisors to their 
customers, leading to further orders for software (with license fees to follow), and additional 
services and training.  The growth strategy was therefore predicated upon the ongoing 
recruitment of high quality BI consultants, and the retention of competent BI staff currently 
in the company’s employ. 
  In 2005 BIC was purchased by a listed diversified holding company (where in 2006 the 
author of this study was employed as a consultant), and by the end of 2006 BIC had an 
annual turnover of just over R36 million and was producing healthy profits.  The company 
was also earning a return well above its cost of capital. 
By the end of 2006 BIC employed 44 staff, divided between three branches (Johannesburg, 
Durban and Cape Town).  The company had a flat management structure – one layer of 
management reported to CEO (who was based in Johannesburg), comprised of the two 
coastal branch managers, a national sales manager, two technical managers (consulting; one 
each in Johannesburg and Cape Town), and a financial manager.  The Cape Town technical 
manager was also responsible for customer and staff training, while CEO looked after 















Officer of the company.  In 2008 BIC was sold to its management team by the holding 
company.  CEO chose not to participate in the management buy-out and took up a senior 
position with the holding company. 
 
4.3 Management Control and Performance Management Framework 
As mentioned above, Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) Performance Management Framework will 
be used to identify BIC’s management control and performance management systems. 
Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 264) refer to their framework as a performance management 
framework, preferring to use “the more general descriptor of performance management 
system (PMS) to capture a holistic approach to the management and control of 
organisational performance.”  However, this study has separated the terms so as to 
distinguish, if necessary, between systems for strategy implementation (management 
control) and systems for strategy management (performance management). 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework consists of twelve sets of questions, all of which have 
been applied to BIC.  The full analysis, supported by answers and explanations by senior 
management, is presented in Appendix A of this study.  Answers to two of the questions 
(Questions 1 and 2) are provided below, followed by an analysis of the results obtained. 
These two questions in particular highlight gaps where elements of socio-ideological control 
have not been detected by Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework.  However, issues 
pertaining to socio-ideological controls, as evidenced by responses to certain of the other 
ten framework questions, have where appropriate been included in the analysis below.   
The level of detail provided in respect of framework answers has been based on the two 
case study examples provided by Ferreira and Otley (2009), whereas the analysis has been 
carried out with reference to the guidelines and objectives pertaining to each set of 




                                                          
1
 The present tense has been adopted for the analysis and discussion of framework questions.  
Although the events occurred some years ago, it is believed that this approach improves the 















4.3.1 Framework Questions and BIC Management Answers: 
1. What is the vision and mission of the organization and how is this brought to the 
attention of managers and employees?  What mechanisms, processes, and networks 
are used to convey the organization’s overarching purposes and objectives to its 
members? 
 
“BIC’s mission statement succinctly tells staff, suppliers and customers what business 
we are in and how we intend to meet their needs.  It is displayed in reception, on screen 
savers and is drummed home at staff inductions, strategic reviews and briefings.  We 
regard it as essential in communicating our mission to all stakeholders.  We have 
worded it like a twenty-second “elevator pitch” so that staff and management can rattle 
it off readily if asked.” – CEO 
 
“Our detailed vision we regard as being pertinent to senior management only.  It is 
objective in that it gives details of where we are taking the company in terms of 
revenues, target markets and technologies.  We don’t think our vision should be 
available for public consumption.  Our broader vision, ‘To be South Africa’s Number 
One BI supplier of choice by striving for excellence in everything we do,’ is drummed 
home to all staff at every opportunity.” – CEO 
 
2. What are the key factors that are believed to be central to the organization’s overall 
future success and how are they brought to the attention of managers and employees? 
 
“Future success will depend on working with the management team to establish a clear 
vision of the future, communicating this to all staff, and putting the mechanisms in 
place to remind management of the agreed strategies to get us there.  It is also 
important to have the right reward systems in place, and to make everyone aware of 
how they and their departments will benefit if we achieve our strategic objectives.  As a 
management team we review our performance against strategic objectives on a 
quarterly basis, based on individual and team KPI’s (key performance indicators) which 
are linked to strategic objectives.  Annual bonuses are also based on meeting KPI 
















“Our people are our greatest resource; having good managers and the best people we 
can afford in all positions is paramount to our success.” – CEO 
 
“The ability to attract and retain the best people is what this business is all about.” – 
Sales Manager, Cape Town, and later Managing Director after management buy-out. 
 
“Our graduate recruitment scheme is turning out to be a great success in terms of hiring 
talented youngsters and keeping them in the business.  Going forward, I can see it 
having a very positive impact.” – BMC (Branch Manager, Cape Town). 
 
4.3.2 Analysis of Framework Questions 
Only framework questions one and two have been analysed below, as these have the 
greatest relevance to socio-ideological control, yet appear not to have detected certain 
aspects of socio-ideological control or their effect on performance management.  Socio-
ideological data from the BIC case study has been introduced where appropriate.  In this 
section, references to Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) paper are, for the sake of brevity, 
shortened to “F&O”. 
Framework Question 1: 
BIC’s vision and mission statements, and the means of communicating and reinforcing them, 
have been addressed by management answers to this question.  However, whilst not 
specifically mentioned in the question, it appears from F&O’s (2009) guidelines that 
organisational values should also be considered when addressing Question 1. 
This is significant, as values which are held as shared basic assumptions form the basis of 
culture (Schein, 2004).  The manner in which Question 1 interrogates organisational values 
will therefore be examined in some detail, particularly as F&O claim to have excluded culture 
from their framework. 
Citing Collins and Porras (1996), F&O note that an organisation’s vision and mission embody 
core values and core purposes.  In discussing the objectives of Question 1, F&O (p. 268) 
explain that the focus of the question is to extract information on how organisational values 
and purposes are established and communicated as a means of influencing the behaviour of 
organizational participants.  F&O go on to mention that the mission may not always be 















F&O also consider values when discussing the intention of Question 12, which addresses the 
strength and coherence of the links between PMS components.  They note (F&O, p. 276) 
that: “Evidence of the importance of translating values into coherent performance measures 
has been shown by Jazayeri and Scapens (2008).” 
In order to address the issue of BIC’s values as implied by F&O’s second question, the 
transcript of an interview with the Chief Executive Officer of BIC is presented below.  
Questions were posed by the researcher, and referred to BIC as a whole.  It later transpired, 
though, when clarification was sought by the researcher, that CEO had answered the 
questions from the point of view of his experience at the JHB branch (where he also filled 
the role of branch manager).  As will be explained later, the interpretation of core values was 
different at the coastal branches, resulting in different methods of management control and 
performance management. 
An analysis of the data collected from the interview follows the response to the final 
interview question. 
Question 1: Does BIC have a values statement?  Or, alternatively, have specific values been 
identified and communicated to staff?  How are values established?  On a top-down basis, or 
via consultation with staff? 
 
CEO answer: “The following is a lis  of the company values contained in the strategic plan: 
customer obsession; passion - for excellence, delivery, our products, and the company; 
individual respect (implying honesty, frankness, integrity); appropriate costs, systems and 
procedures; and innovation, which includes smart working and smart solution provision. 
These are communicated to all employees at the annual strategy briefing and by myself on 
doing the first hour of the induction for new employees. At this induction, I cover the history 
of the company, our strategies and values.  The values were established top-down by myself 
when I came into the company but are reviewed annually and have changed over time – but 
not much.” 
Question 2: Do the values support the attainment of strategic objectives?  
CEO answer: “I believe that they have helped to establish a culture which does support our 
objective of increasing our service revenue, through becoming trusted advisors and 















Question 3: Are values re-assessed at any stage, or have core values been established and 
then maintained? 
CEO answer: “Core values were established when I came into the company and have been 
maintained, with a review annually but with little change in the principles behind the stated 
values.” 
Question 4: Is any process in place to reinforce the company’s values?   
CEO answer: “This reinforcement is carried out from time to time by myself and branch 
managers in meetings and discussions, particularly when we are faced with challenges. 
Typical situations were when BIC had been overpaid by customers, delivery had not met our 
standards, etcetera.  We would review our values and make appropriate decisions to 
reinforce the culture enshrined in our values.” 
Question 5: What happens if a staff member or members do not behave in accordance with 
company values?  
CEO answer: “Depending on the severity of the transgression, staff members are counselled 
or disciplined in line with the company’s disciplinary code.”  
Question 6: Do the directors and senior management team share pretty much the same or 
similar values?  
CEO answer: “Yes.  I am fortunate in having a number of the management team who think 
similarly to me.  Had this not been the case, I probably would have had to replace one or two 
so that there was greater similarity of thinking in the management team.” 
Question 7: In recruiting key personnel, do you look to recruit people who seem to share 
BIC’s core values? 
CEO answer: “Yes, apart from qualifications, we look for stable employment records, good 
references of customer service and an ability to get on with colleagues in particular.” 
Question 8: Do you find that staff retention is better among those who share the company’s 
core values?  
CEO answer: “Yes we do, although there have been times when large companies were 















resulted in high turnover as we could not match these packages, despite the cultural fit of 
the staff members.” 
Question 9: Do people who share the company’s core values generally perform better than 
those who don’t? 
CEO answer: “Yes. They tend to have a longer term view and are more committed to both 
their careers and the customer, they tend to gossip less and deliver more.” 
Question 10: Do you think it important that company directors and senior management are 
seen to be living the company’s values? 
 CEO answer: “Absolutely.  A failure in this area causes distrust and an unravelling of the 
company.  Having said this, too rigid an approach to all of the values is also a challenge 
especially in younger staff who still need mentoring.” 
Question 11: Are there staff members who didn’t initially buy in to company values, but who 
have come to do so over time?  
CEO answer: “This seldom happens and parting company sooner rather than later is 
essential.  Such people tend to become frustrated, aggressive towards management citing 
micromanagement and old fashioned attitudes as detrimental to the company growth, and 
cause severe damage to the general harmony in the company.  Younger staff do better in 
adapting but generally, if they do get into the company with very different values and 
attitudes it is hard to change them.” 
Question 12: Do you think it is possible to change people’s values, and if so, how or under 
what circumstances is this possible?  
CEO answer: “Yes, I believe it is possible if one can demonstrate consistency, and the logic 
and/or benefit of the espoused values to the organisation and the individual.  This I have 
found not to be easy, requiring regular reinforcement at appropriate times and most 
successful in younger employees. The carrot of praise for adherence seems to work better 
than the stick when it comes to reinforcing values.” 
4.3.3 Analysis of Interviewee Responses by Application of F&O’s Framework 
It is evident from F&O’s discussion of values that they do not distinguish between (i) 
espoused values and (ii) shared basic assumptions.  The guidelines provided by F&O do, 















the means of establishing and communicating values intended to influence employee 
behaviour, and for assessing the impact of these processes on managerial behaviour at all 
levels. 
If espoused values are also held as shared basic assumptions (the deeper level of values 
which form the basis of culture), the application of F&O’s framework will not detect the 
influence of the shared basic assumptions on behaviour, and is likely instead to attribute the 
control effect to the communicated values.   
Where shared basic assumptions are different from espoused values, the control effect of 
the shared basic assumptions would go undetected.  On the other hand, where espoused 
values have not been accepted by employees and do not influence employee behaviour, the 
lack of any control effect should be detected by F&O’s framework.  An explanation for the 
lack of any behavioural effect by the espoused values would, however, not be forthcoming.  
F&O’s treatment of values is therefore valid to the extent that it allows for the detection of 
espoused values (Framework Question 1), the detection of any control effect emanating 
from these values, and the extent to which there is coherence between espoused values and 
other aspects of the PMS (Framework Question 12). 
The application of F&O’s framework does therefore allow for the identification of BIC’s core 
espoused values, and for an interrogation of the manner in which they influence behaviour.  
BIC’s espoused values are broad in nature, and are interpreted at the company level in much 
the same way by most of the management team.  They are used at a company level as the 
basis of decision-making, particularly in challenging times.  The way in which espoused 
values are applied by the management team to deal in particular with external issues, can 
best be expressed by the phrase: “Treat your customers as you would wish to be treated.” 
Differences in the interpretation of the broad espoused values occur at branch level.  These 
flow from certain different basic assumptions held by branch managers, as mentioned in the 
next paragraph.  These are related to the issues emerging from Question 2 of the 
framework, and will therefore be better dealt with in the analysis of the responses to this 
question. 
It is in the area of basic assumptions that F&O’s framework appears to have shortcomings.  
As far as the methods of management control and performance management are 
concerned, CEO holds different basic assumptions from those of the two coastal branch 















to be detected by F&O’s framework.  However, these differences contribute to the 
formation of a different sub-culture at the Johannesburg branch compared to the coastal 
branches, as well as to different forms of management control.  The different basic 
assumptions also lead to friction between CEO and the coastal branch managers, and 
between CEO and many of his Johannesburg Business Intelligence consultants. 
Because of the interrelationship between these issues and those emerging from Question 2 
of F&O’s framework, the detailed discussion thereof will be deferred to the next section.  
What the above-mentioned discussion has highlighted, however, is that F&O’s framework is 
not able to detect basic assumptions which have not been expressed as espoused values.  As 
will be seen in the next section, this can have far-reaching implications for culture formation, 
management control, and performance management. 
It is also possible that, because F&O do not distinguish between espoused values and shared 
basic assumptions, the espoused values supporting the mission may appear to have a high 
level of coherence with the PMS.  However, this could be misleading as they may not have 
much influence on behaviour (because they have not been adopted by employees, and have 
therefore also not had the chance to become shared basic assumptions). 
Framework Question 2 
Of particular interest here are the answers by BIC management (regarding future success 
factors) which relate specifically to the employment and retention of competent staff.  
Taken in conjunction with CEO’s description of the need to align strategic targets and 
incentives, it is easy to interpret these answers as implying: “Employ good people and 
incentivise them appropriately to ensure future success.”  Such an interpretation, however, 
overlooks the important effect of personnel and cultural controls.  These will initially be 
discussed in a holistic manner (in recognition of their interdependence), whereafter the 
specific characteristics and relevance of each will be highlighted.  
CEO’s Approach to Management Control and Performance Management, and the Sub-
Culture at the JHB Branch. 
(i) CEO’s Approach to Management Control: 
It became apparent over time that CEO held a basic assumption that “if you can’t measure it, 
you can’t manage it.”  CEO was exposed quite early in his working career to a mentor who 















technocratic principles.  CEO came to appreciate the value of this system, and adopted it as 
his own. 
The management control and performance management systems implemented by CEO are 
based on this same quantitative, technocratic approach.  CEO’s systems do not recognise 
that BIC’s business plan depends largely on the competence, experience, and ingenuity of its 
BI consultants, who must devise and implement unique solutions in a variety of different 
client companies.  This means that, to perform effectively, consultants need to possess 
certain specific competencies, as well as the ability to exercise a high degree of self control 
or self monitoring.  By overlooking the issue of self control, and by applying regular 
monitoring and technocratic forms of control, CEO antagonised many of the Johannesburg 
Business Intelligence consultants and, to a lesser extent, the Cape Town and Durban branch 
managers as well.  
CEO’s approach to control had certain consequences, which can be understood in the light 
of the following quotes: (These will first be presented and then analysed) 
CEO on the problem of recruiting and retaining good BI consultants:  “It differs greatly 
between the coast [Durban and Cape Town] and Johannesburg. On the coast, staff look for a 
stable, learning environment, reasonable remuneration and regular recognition.  Given that 
there is less competition for skills, staff tend to stay longer and leave only to pursue 
significant growth opportunities or overseas travel or work.  In Johannesburg the same 
criteria are required by staff but a much greater emphasis is placed on earning and earning 
potential in accepting a job.  Many of the consultants left for more money in the boom times 
when skills were short.” 
CEO on the reasons for having “Personnel” as one of his seven key strategic performance 
areas:  “You will see from our selection criteria that teamwork and co-operation are 
important to us.  In addition, we have had high turnover of scarce staff at times and the cost 
was prohibitive. Because of this we need to impress on management the need to recruit 
well, start up and look after their staff well.  This applies particularly to consulting staff who 
are mostly at the customer and if not regularly engaged with, coached, and directed by 
management, [underlined for emphasis] could become either delinquent, disillusioned or 
the “Stockholm Syndrome” could come into play. This manifests itself in their taking greater 















Long-term Johannesburg consultant on CEO’s management style:  “CEO is a complete control 
freak.  But he’s also a good, fair guy.  I don’t let him faze me; as long as you do your job 
properly you’re okay.  Some people can’t take his style, though, and most of them end up 
leaving.” 
CEO on consultants who [apparently] did not buy-in to BIC’s values:  “Such people tend to 
become frustrated, aggressive towards management citing micromanagement and old 
fashioned attitudes as detrimental to the company growth, and cause severe damage to the 
general harmony in the company.“ 
CEO (in 2011) on his perception of the BIC culture during the course of his tenure as Chief 
Executive Officer:  “High integrity, emotionally intelligent, pride in consistent solid 
achievement, conservative.  Maybe too conservative; this is probably why innovation wasn’t 
as high as it could have been.” 
CEO in response to the (2011) question: ‘Were there any aspects of the BIC culture you would 
have liked to change, or do you think the culture appropriately supported the company’s 
aims and objectives?’ 
“As with many businesses, their strategies are more evolutionary than revolutionary.  I had 
hoped that the company would evolve into a more innovative and “cool” employment 
environment.  Despite various attempts at management level to stimulate innovation i.e. 
articles, brainstorming sessions etc, this was not to be.  I think that my conservative nature 
had something to do with this and after seven years at the helm, I believe that the business 
needed a different leader with fresh ideas – MD took on the Managing Director role [after 
the management buy-out]; he comes from a sales background, is very good with people but 
not so good on detailed analysis and finance - we hired a good financial manager to do this - 
and has taken the business from 45 staff in 2009 to 75 staff today, with a branch in 
Switzerland - a strategy that he put in place in 2009.” 
Cape Town branch manager BMC (in 2011) on CEO’s management style:  “CEO is a typical 
accountant.  His analysis paralysis used to drive me crazy!  But I have to admit he got results.  
He also changed the way some of us thought about the business, particularly regarding 
where we wanted to be in the future.  That was definitely a good thing.  I think he laid a solid 
















(ii) Discussion of Johannesburg Branch Sub-Culture 
While there was an element of clan control in place in the Johannesburg branch, this was 
not nearly as cohesive as in the two coastal branches.  To employ Ouchi’s (1980), and Wilkins 
and Ouchi’s (1983) transaction cost theory, long-term consultants in Johannesburg appeared 
to have accepted that they would get something of value (i.e. acceptable remuneration and 
the ability to work in diverse surroundings doing interesting and challenging work), and in 
return would accept CEO’s controlling ways.  
There might also have been elements of goal congruence present (as defined by Wilkins and 
Ouchi, 1983); the belief that staff members would be treated fairly in the long run in 
exchange for doing a good job and accepting CEO’s modus operandi.  It might also be that 
those members who did not mind the tighter controls (the engagement, coaching and 
direction mentioned by CEO above) did not see them as forms of control as such, but rather 
as signs of management interest in their work.  (This is in fact what CEO believed he was 
conveying, thereby helping to avoid the “Stockholm Syndrome”). 
It is also possible that those who took offence at CEO’s control methods were under-
performing.  This may be illustrated with reference to two quotes involving General Electric’s 
chief executive officer Jack Welch.  In 1993 Welch was quoted as saying: “The old 
organization was built on control, but the world has changed.  The world is moving at such a 
pace that control has become a limitation.  It slows you down.  You’ve got to balance 
freedom with some control, but you’ve got to have more freedom than you ever dreamed 
of” (Welch, 1993, p. 21, as cited by Nixon and Burns, 2005, p. 260). 
However, this can be contrasted with the following observation by an ex-General Electric 
manager regarding Welch’s management style: “If you’re doing well, you probably have 
more freedom than most CEO’s of publicly traded companies.  But the leash gets pulled very 
tightly when a unit is underperforming” (Merchant and Van Der Stede, 2007, p. 225). 
CEO may well have been tightening the leash on underperforming consultants, and their 
accusations of micro-management may simply have been a defence mechanism.  It is also 
feasible that certain consultants were lured away from BIC by the big financial packages on 
offer.  However, many consultants probably did leave the Johannesburg branch of BIC 
because CEO was employing what they perceived to be inappropriate control methods. 
This is in line with the findings of Abernethy and Stoelwinder, (1995) who in a study of 91 















professional orientation regarded output forms of control most offensive, i.e. where 
superiors imposed targets then measured performance against those targets.  However, 
where self-regulatory activities were not restricted, role conflict was reduced and individual 
job satisfaction and overall sub-unit performance were improved. 
A similar situation prevailed at Johannesburg during CEO’s time at BIC; for example, 
measures such as the number of billable hours per consultant, sales revenue earned per 
head, PBIT per head, and a productivity measure which compared employee productivity 
growth with annual Consumer Price Index growth, were used to evaluate individual 
performance.  This is likely to have frustrated consultants attempting to “transform complex 
business rules into comprehensible visualisations, by using Business Intelligence tools to 
design dashboards, cubes, static reports and more in complex environments” (Senior 
consultant with more than 10 years’ experience with BIC at the time of the case study). 
Although the same technocratic performance measures mentioned above were 
implemented company-wide, and had to be reported on by the other two branches as well, 
the branch managers at Cape Town and Durban did not rely on these quantitative targets for 
control purposes.  This will be discussed in more detail below. 
Contrasting the Sub-Cultures of the Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban Branches 
The sub-culture of the Cape Town branch stands in stark contrast to that of the 
Johannesburg branch.  BMC explained that the Cape Town branch was established by one of 
BIC’s founders back in 1978.  According to BMC: “He was an absolute gentleman; very polite 
and respectful to everyone, but also very professional and hard-working.  The values that he 
established are still in place today.” 
BMC, an ex-consultant who was employed by the founder more than twenty years ago, 
explained that similar values to those espoused by BIC were lived by the founder.  The most 
significant difference was that all staff recruited were expected to be professional in their 
outlook and behaviour.  This implied the delivery of excellent work and an adherence to the 
founder’s work ethic.  The expectation that consultants would behave in a professional 
manner was based on trust rather than any attempts at supervision or evaluation against 
outputs; BMC noted that consultants who shared the founder’s values thrived at the 
company (and stayed), while those who did not “were out in no time.” 
The recruitment and selection process at Cape Town was also very different from 















Description, including a list of required attributes.  He then interviewed all short-listed 
consultants, using a structured interview process.  (The short list was drawn up after 
candidates had been interviewed in the first instance by the Technical Manager - 
Consulting).  
Among other things, applicants were tested for compliance with BIC’s core values.  This was 
done by asking applicants how they had acted in the past in certain work-related situations.  
If candidates had not experienced these situations they were provided with hypothetical 
situations and asked to explain how they would react.  The interview process applied was in 
line with accepted human resource practices, and compares favourably with other forms of 
selection such as cognitive ability tests (Arnold et al, 2005). 
While the interview process in Johannesburg was sound, and could well have led to a good 
person-organisation fit (Cable and Judge, 1996, 1997) CEO admits that in certain instances, 
and particularly in times of high staff turnover, when demand for Business Intelligence skills 
was high, people who might otherwise have been rejected were in fact employed.  Such 
employees were very seldom, if ever, a success, despite going through the normal BIC 
induction process. 
This can be compared to the graduate recruitment scheme put in place at the Cape Town 
branch in 2003 to recruit future Business Intelligence consultants.  (This was to facilitate the 
branch’s growth plans and to address the recognised looming shortage of BI skills).  This 
scheme involves the recruitment of good (in terms of academic achievement) Honours 
graduates from the University of Cape Town’s Information Systems programme.  Similar 
interviewing techniques are employed in Cape Town as in Johannesburg, but short-listed 
candidates are also required to complete professionally-administered personality and other 
psychometric tests in an attempt to ensure a good fit between Cape Town branch values and 
candidates’ values. 
Successful candidates are then provided with classroom training on relevant Business 
Intelligence products, followed by on-the-job training in the company of an experienced BIC 
consultant who acts as a mentor to the new recruit.  After being judged competent, the 
young graduates are given the title of Junior Consultant.  They are then assigned to a 
practical assignment at a client company.  However, in contrast to Johannesburg where it 
was the norm rather than the exception at the time of the case study for consultants to work 















never less than two consultants assigned to a client firm in Cape Town (thereby negating the 
“Stockholm Syndrome” effect, but without the need for regular management interventions). 
Five years after the initial graduate intake in Cape Town, all four initial appointees were still 
with the firm, and the retention of staff recruited via the programme remains excellent as at 
2011.  Over the years, graduates who have adapted and thrived at Cape Town have been 
used to attract new recruits; they have been asked to refer friends or colleagues to BIC.  
(These friends or colleagues might be at rival firms, or about to graduate from the University 
of Cape Town IT programme).  This has ensured a constant stream of new recruits, and an 
even better fit in terms of Cape Town branch values and new employees. 
Not only are Cape Town consultants shielded from the technocratic BIC performance 
evaluation process, they are also assessed in terms of their specific competencies and 
interests.  They are then encouraged to develop their careers in these specific directions, 
and are provided with ongoing support and training to facilitate this.  A career path allows 
promotion from Junior Consultant to Consultant, and then to Senior Consultant.  As the 
company grows, or in cases of natural attrition, interested and competent Senior 
Consultants can move into management positions, as promotions are made from within the 
organisation whenever possible. 
BIC’s Durban branch uses the same Business Intelligence Consultant Job Description as 
Johannesburg, and looks for the same attributes in consultants.  Consultants are selected as 
much on the basis of perceived ‘fit’ with the organisation as on technical skills.  Staff 
turnover is very low, and branch manager DBM maintains that they can afford to take their 
time when recruiting new candidates to ensure that they employ team players who will fit 
the culture.  Levels of trust between management and staff are high, and Durban branch is 
generally regarded by consultants as a “cool” place to work. 
A theme that emerges strongly from the researcher’s study of the culture of BIC is the role of 
trust, both as a control measure and as a means of reinforcing the culture.  (Thereby 
supporting Ouchi’s (1979) observation that people in organisations must either be able to 
trust each other or closely monitor each other).  One of the themes that was often referred 
to at BIC management meetings, and which was actually one of the strategic personnel 
objectives, was: “Create a culture of ‘self-employed-within-an-enabling-environment’ in all 
staff.”  This researcher’s first impression was that this would send a dangerous message to 















However, the way in which this objective was applied (particularly in Cape Town and 
Durban) actually had the opposite effect.  For example, based on the exercise of their own 
judgement and of the needs and attitudes of their clients, consultants could choose their 
hours of work.  Also, between consultancy assignments and at other appropriate times 
during assignments, consultants could choose to work from home if they believed that this 
would be more effective.  All of the branches had open-plan, ‘hot-desk’ arrangements, so 
that consultants could choose to work at the office between assignments, but this was left 
to their own discretion. 
What is more, between assignments consultants were rewarded for good performance or 
for ‘going the extra mile’ with clients by being allowed to attend IT training programmes of 
their choice (all paid for by BIC).  These programmes were often work-related or BI product-
related, but could also be in an area of IT in which the consultant had a particular interest.  
All of this served to increase consultant skills, but also made them more marketable and, 
theoretically, more likely to leave BIC to pursue better opportunities. 
However, this was very rarely if ever the case (other than in Johannesburg).  This approach 
by BIC actually strengthened loyalty to the company, was hugely appreciated by the 
consultants, and therefore had a win-win effect; consultants improved their skills, while at 
the same time receiving the strong message that the company trusted them and had their 
best interests at heart.  This in turn reinforced the feeling that BIC was a special place at 
which to work, and reinforced the culture of the clan.  
In terms of artefacts, the remaining level of culture identified in this study but not yet 
addressed, both Johannesburg and Cape Town did make use of heroes, symbols, story-telling 
and simple rituals to reinforce values and culture.  For example, shortly after taking over as 
Chief Executive Officer of BIC, in the face of a looming financial crisis CEO volunteered to 
take a pay cut and asked senior managers to do the same.  This was negotiated on the basis 
of increased incentives for performance achievement, and against an agreed timescale. 
As CEO explains, this was greeted with unhappiness and some scepticism, as managers had 
been let down by the previous owners in respect of similar profit sharing schemes.  
However, CEO managed to get agreement, and within a year a substantial financial recovery 
had been achieved (due more to good fortune than management effort, according to CEO). 
However, bonuses were duly paid in strict accordance with the agreement, and CEO gained 















negotiated, CEO was invariably mentioned by the managers concerned as the ‘hero’ who 
had put in place and honoured the first incentive scheme.  This story became part of BIC’s 
culture, and served to reinforce the values of integrity and respect for individuals. 
Other company stories included the refund of a large client overpayment (which could easily 
have been avoided), because it was in line with BIC’s values, and the waiving of a charge of 
R140 000 for billable work carried out for a client but attributable to errors in the Business 
Intelligence software (which BIC implemented under licence).  As a direct consequence of 
this latter action, the client concerned placed a large order with BIC some ten months later.  
These became part of the ‘folklore’ which was passed on to each generation of new 
consultants.   
BMC has also noted that stories dating back to the founder’s time are still told in the Cape 
Town branch to this day, and further serve to reinforce the culture and the sense of being a 
“special company.”  Rituals in Cape Town include an obligatory get-together for all staff on 
Friday afternoons, for a short informal meeting accompanied by drinks and snacks.  All 
branches celebrate the achievement of sales targets or the gaining of a new client with 
champagne or pizzas, and regular staff barbecues (which include family members and 
partners of single staff) are held to celebrate successes. 
Symbols used to reinforce the culture included the displaying of the company mission 
statement in branch reception areas, and on personal computer screen-savers.  The mission 
statement is referred to regularly; in meetings, and at induction sessions for new staff 
members.  Along with the other artefacts mentioned above, this does appear to reinforce 
the cultural web at BIC’s branches (Johnson, 1992). 
 
4.4 Overview of Findings 
In an introduction to the article in which he expounds his Levers of Control framework, 
Simons (1995) observes that managers in organisations which operate in dynamic and highly 
competitive markets cannot spend most of their time supervising subordinates.  Nor, as he 
says, “is it realistic to think that managers can achieve control by simply hiring good people, 
aligning incentives, and hoping for the best” (Simons, 1995, p. 80). 
It is submitted that in the case study company, CEO at the Johannesburg branch did in fact 
subscribe to the view that employing good people, then setting challenging targets and 















is clearly expressed in the CEO quotes addressed to the future success of BIC (Framework 
Question 2 per F&O, page 53 of this study). 
Upon reflection, Simons’ (1995) statement may contain a half-truth; it is possible that hiring 
good people and aligning incentives might be effective, but only in conjunction with cultural 
controls.  This will be illustrated in the discussion which follows.   
It is the recognition of the role of culture in facilitating control that highlights yet another of 
the weaknesses of F&O’s framework.  If the answers to Question 2 of F&O’s framework are 
taken at face value, the conclusion might well be that the success enjoyed by BIC, and the 
potential future success, was dependent upon appropriate goals, competent people, and 
incentives designed to encourage the achievement of those goals. 
However, it is suggested that to take this view is to miss the effect of cultural (i.e. clan) 
controls, as well as the important supplementary effect of the personnel controls which 
support them.  This is not to negate entirely the effect of formal controls; however, as will 
be demonstrated, the major and most important forms of control in BIC were cultural and 
personnel controls. 
This conclusion can be based on the different results achieved by the coastal branches 
compared to those realised by the Johannesburg branch, and on the means by which those 
results were achieved.  It was apparent that BIC’s espoused values and the deeply-held 
beliefs of the senior management team were quite well aligned.  However, what was 
different was, in certain instances, the way in which those beliefs were translated into 
behaviours. 
This highlights, perhaps, a danger inherent in generalised espoused beliefs such as dignity, 
integrity and so on.  To CEO, applying formal output-based controls to consultants did not 
violate the company’s “individual respect” value; however, to the people being managed in 
this way it did, signalling mistrust and a lack of acknowledgement of their ability to do the 
right thing when not being closely monitored.   
It is pertinent in this regard to note the findings of Jazayeri and Scapens (2008), who 
investigated a five-year culture change programme at BAE, a UK aerospace company.  To 
effect a change in culture, the company’s top 130 managers identified five categories of core 
values which were regarded to be essential to the company’s future success.  These values 
were then translated into appropriate performance measures (both financial and non-















At the outset fewer than ten measures were included on the scorecard, but as the managers 
used the scorecard it was over time expanded to incorporate some 70 or 80 measures.  It 
was believed that the scorecard became more accurate and meaningful as understanding 
grew.  In the same way, BIC might have benefited from looking more closely and in greater 
detail at the behaviours required by their more generic values.  By doing so, and by 
questioning the assumptions of various managers, CEO may well have come to see his 
management style in a different light. 
As things stood, the managers of the coastal branches experienced frustration as a result of 
CEO’s formal controls, but could largely ignore them once back at their own branches.  
Durban produced relatively better financial results than the Johannesburg branch, whereas 
Cape Town outdid the Johannesburg branch both in relative and absolute terms. 
This relieved the coastal branches of any performance pressure, and as a result the coastal 
branch managers could continue to use what they considered to be appropriate control 
measures, with CEO’s formal controls being regarded simply as a means of providing a 
‘scorecard’ on a quarterly basis.  To his credit, and in line with the ‘individual respect’ value, 
CEO did not interfere in the running of the coastal branches.  
It is submitted that clan controls (strongly supported by personnel controls) were employed 
by both the Durban and Cape Town branches, and that the other aspects of culture i.e. 
values and artefacts also contributed to BIC’s control efforts.  The Cape Town branch will 
now be used to illustrate the use of values, clan controls, artefacts and personnel controls.  
If one considers the aforementioned descriptions of the circumstances, practices, and 
procedures in place at the Cape Town branch, it can be seen that these correspond largely to 
the prerequisite conditions required (per the literature) for the formation of a clan culture, 
i.e.: 
 A strict screening and selection process, to improve the likelihood that people with 
the same values and orientations as the organisation are employed (Ouchi, 1979); 
 Reasonably long membership and reasonably stable membership of the organisation 
(Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983); 
 A strong and shared claim of uniqueness (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983); 
 The telling of shared stories that illustrate and legitimise a common management 















At Cape Town, values established by the founder and passed down via employees who had 
worked with the founder (e.g. BMC) still guided decisions at the branch.  Considering the 
timescale involved, the founder’s values were now, in respect of senior staff members, likely 
to be deeply held convictions.  They were used as the basis of selecting new members of 
staff, and were reinforced as the correct way to behave (Schein, 2004).   
Personnel controls (i.e. those controls which serve to clarify the organisation’s expectations, 
to help ensure that each employee has all of the capabilities and resources necessary to do a 
good job, and to increase the likelihood that each employee will engage in self-monitoring 
(Merchant and Van Der Stede, 2007)) were implemented by way of selection and screening, 
mentoring, training, performance reviews, promotion from within, and identifying particular 
aptitudes and abilities and supporting the development of these.   
Cultural artefacts which helped to reinforce the clan culture included shared stories, rituals 
(as described previously), and symbols (such as public displays of vision and mission 
statements, personal displays of same by way of PC screen-savers, and values statements as 
part of induction programmes) (Johnson, 1992; Ouchi, 2004). 
Research carried out subsequent to Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) supports the screening and 
selection effect on clan formation.  The findings that firms select employees on the basis of 
shared perceived values (Cable and Judge, 1996), and that candidates select firms on the 
same basis (Cable and Judge, 1997), will have improved the cohesiveness of the clan. 
While the Cape Town branch has been used as an example, clan culture and controls 
appeared to be in place at Durban as well, for much the same reasons.  Only in 
Johannesburg, as outlined before, was the clan effect likely to have been absent or very 
much weaker.  As far as BIC as an organisation was concerned, it is difficult to speak of an 
overriding culture.  However, the espoused values (which in terms of many of the values 
may well have been held as shared basic assumptions as well) did act as an over-arching 
framework which guided important decisions.  
This case study has gone some way towards answering the research question regarding the 
desirability of culture as a control variable being included in the F&O framework.  The case 
study has also addressed the issues of clan control and personnel control, with evidence 
from the study corroborating the findings from the literature in terms of clan formation and 
clan culture, and supporting the contention that personnel controls have an important 















The findings from the case study support the notion that clan culture results in employees 
exercising a positive form of self-control in support of organisational goals and objectives. It 
has also been observed that clan culture is in turn supported and reinforced by values, 
artefacts and personnel controls.  Furthermore, case study findings support those from the 
literature which suggest that clan or cultural control is appropriate in knowledge-intensive 
firms such as BIC (Ouchi, 1979; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Ditillo, 2004), that formal, 
output based controls may be counter-productive and even harmful under certain 
circumstances (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995), and that sub-cultures are possible even in 
small organisations (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). 
The case study findings also suggest that the use of technocratic controls in conjunction with 
clan controls may be of some benefit, if used judiciously.  Goals and objectives based on 
quantitative, technocratic controls served to reinforce strategic growth objectives, whereas 
measures such as billable hours worked by consultants served as a reminder that a balance 
had to be maintained between creativity and innovation on the one hand, and an acceptable 
level of profitability on the other.  This confirms the findings of Alvesson and Kärreman 
(2004) who noted that technocratic controls, employed by a knowledge-intensive firm in 
support of clan controls, drew attention to certain dimensions and also framed 
consciousness in a particular way. 
4.4.1 Implications of the Findings for Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) Framework 
F&O do not exclude any organisational types from analysis via their framework, saying only 
that their framework should highlight control issues in for-profit and not-for-profit 
organisations.  As such, the framework should in principle be able to identify the main 
control methods employed by a knowledge-intensive firm such as BIC. 
However, by ignoring personnel controls, clan controls and shared basic assumptions (other 
than those expressed as espoused values which have been adopted by employees), F&O’s 
framework does not adequately address many of the control issues emerging from the case 
study.  In fact, by highlighting the technocratic controls employed by BIC and ignoring the 
effects of the personnel and clan controls, the framework presents an inaccurate 
representation of the controls within BIC.  This supports the contention of Chenhall (2003, p. 
131): “Thus, if specific accounting controls are systematically linked with other 
organizational controls, studies that exclude or do not control for these elements within the 















4.4.2 The Ability of Suggested Enhancements to Address the Shortcomings in Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2009) Framework 
In the same edition of the journal Management Accounting Research in which Ferreira and 
Otley (2009) published their performance management and control framework, Broadbent 
and Laughlin (2009) published a paper which suggested certain enhancements to F&O’s 
framework2.  Ferreira and Otley (2009) did not incorporate Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2007) 
suggestions into their framework, but in their discussion of Question 10 of their framework 
F&O (p. 275) acknowledge that the work is valuable from the perspective of their 
framework.  They also note Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2007) findings that culture has a 
significant effect on PMS design. 
This raises the following question: If incorporated into F&O’s framework, would Broadbent 
and Laughlin’s proposed changes address the shortcomings in F&O’s framework identified in 
this research study?  To answer this question, and thereby help to address Objective four of 
this study (the robustness and adequacy of F&O’s framework), Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2009) will be analysed and evaluated. 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) have, in a conceptual paper, suggested an enhancement to 
F&O’s framework which allows for performance management systems to be categorised 
along a given continuum.  The continuum measures the extent to which means-end 
relationships governed by performance management systems can be determined.  As 
mentioned previously, the literature reviewed so far suggests that clan or cultural forms of 
control are more appropriate where means-ends relationships are not clear.   
Although Broadbe t and Laughlin (2009) do not explicitly claim to identify a form of cultural 
control, F&O (2009) believe that Broadbent and Laughlin’s enhancement relates to culture, 
as do  Berry et al (2009, p.7), who state that Broadbent and Laughlin (2007) extend the 
“culture part of the PMC,” i.e. of Ferreira and Otley’s (2005) performance management and 
control framework.   
                                                          
2
 F&O refer in their 2009 paper to Broadbent and Laughlin’s 2007 working paper, which was 
developed into the 2009 article mentioned above.  And, when Broadbent and Laughlin (2007) 
suggested enhancements to F&O’s performance management and control framework, they were 
referring to the framework originally set out in Ferreira and Otley’s (2005) working paper (which 
proposed a framework which was virtually identical to the 2009 version).  In further discussions, the 
2009 versions of both F&O’s and Broadbent and Laughlin’s work will be referred to.  This will allow for 















It is possible that the claims made by Berry et al (2009) and F&O (2009) are valid, when 
suggesting that Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2007) enhancements relate to the identification 
of cultural control.  If so, this would go some if not all of the way towards addressing the 
shortcomings identified by this study, regarding the inability of F&O’s framework to identify 
cultural and clan controls.  The validity of these claims will therefore be examined. 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2009, p. 293) suggest that all performance management systems 
can be placed on a “continuum of conceptual possibilities, from ‘transactional’ to 
‘relational’.  Transactional PMSs are those regulating clear means/end relationships, 
whereas relational PMSs are characterised by means/end relationships which are not clear.  
In the case of relational situations, the resulting performance management systems will be 
negotiated by participants/stakeholders who would discursively agree the choice of means 
to pursue agreed ends.  “The expectation is that the ends and means are deliberately subject 
to a discourse between the stakeholders and chosen by them” (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2009, p. 289). 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2009, p. 289) provide the following example of a relational 
performance management system: “An example might involve the bringing together of a 
number of engineers to analyse and resolve an engineering concern where the outcomes 
and the ways these are defined and achieved are subject to discursive negotiation and 
agreement.” 
It is apparent that Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2009) relational performance management 
system might involve a high degree of informal interaction between participants, but the 
resultant control may not necessarily be cultural in nature and does not depend upon the 
same pre-conditions necessary for clan formation.  In that means and ends can be identified 
and agreed, albeit by discursive negotiation, Broadbent and Laughlin’s example falls well 
short of the situation found in most knowledge-intensive firms, where means-end 
relationships are tenuous at best.   
For example, in the BIC case study on which this dissertation is based, consultants had to 
manage the tension between the need to achieve company financial goals, and the need to 
satisfy client needs for appropriate Business Intelligence systems.  In this instance two 
different and often competing ends had to be intuitively and creatively met by consultants, a 
requirement that could only be achieved via the self-control and collaborative effort 















It is possible in the example provided by Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) that a clan-type 
culture could develop among the team of engineers over time, if the members of the team 
remained much the same and if the other pre-conditions for clan formation were met.  
However, if the existing culture of the organisation rewarded individual efforts rather than 
teamwork, the efforts of the team could be hampered, and the negotiation of a working 
relationship might prove to be a difficult undertaking. 
It is submitted that the additional insights provided by Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) do 
address the important issue of control in situations where means-ends relationships are not 
clear.  However, they fall short of providing a complete solution by ignoring the existing 
culture of the organisation, by failing to consider the clan mechanism, and by neglecting to 
consider the more extreme end of the transactional/relational continuum, where means-
ends relationships are tenuous at best. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The findings from the case study confirm that Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework is 
deficient to the extent that it cannot identify a number of socio-ideological controls.  The 
findings also raise the concern that, by highlighting the technocratic controls employed by 
an organisation and ignoring the socio-ideological controls, the framework would under 
certain circumstances present an inaccurate representation of an organisation’s overall 
“bundle of controls” (Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
An analysis of Broadbent and Laughlin (2009), said to address the cultural aspects of control 
in F&O’s framework, reveals that the conceptual changes suggested will help to identify 
organisational situations where low means-end relationships exist.  However, Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2009) do not suggest that such situations may be an indicator of the presence of 
cultural or other socio-ideological controls, nor do they provide guidance as to how such 
controls might function or how they might be detected. 
In the next chapter, the extent to which the aims and objectives of the study have been met 
will be discussed, and conclusions will be drawn.  Limitations of the study will be addressed, 


















5.1 Research Aims, Objectives and Research Question 
This study set out to investigate whether socio-ideological controls, such as organisational 
culture, clan controls, and personnel controls should be included in Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) PMS template, designed to identify the major control and performance management 
issues within an organisation. 
To this end, the following objectives were established: 
 To identify and assess, with reference to the relevant literature, those socio-
ideological controls which can make a positive contribution to management control 
and performance management in organisations. 
 To evaluate the technocratic and socio-ideological management controls employed 
by a small South African consulting firm, using Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
performance management framework and the insights into socio-ideological control 
obtained from the literature review.  
 To re-assess the robustness and adequacy of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework, 
based on the results of the above two objectives.   
The first objective was achieved in Chapter 2 of the study, and the second objective in 
Chapter 4.  Conclusions which can be drawn from the attainment of the first two objectives 
will now be discussed, which will allow for the robustness and adequacy of Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2009) framework to be assessed.  This will address the third objective, and will also 
provide an answer to the research question: 
“Should Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) performance management framework be expanded to 
include socio-ideological controls as an aspect of management control and performance 
management?” 
Finally, the broader implications of the findings of this study will be considered, limitations 
















5.2 An Assessment of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) Framework: Conclusions Drawn from the 
Study 
The literature review identified two broad categories of socio-ideological controls, namely 
cultural controls (comprising artefacts, values, and clan control), and personnel controls.  
Both the literature review and the case study which form the basis of this research, suggest 
that cultural and personnel controls can contribute towards management control and 
performance management efforts in organisations.  The manner in which they do so and the 
implications for Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework will now be discussed.  Suggested 
changes or additions to Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework will be addressed in each 
section, where relevant. 
5.2.1 Values and Clan Controls 
Although Ferreira and Otley (2009) (hereinafter referred to as F&O) chose to exclude cultural 
controls from their evaluative framework, they did consider the ability of values to influence 
behaviour.  In doing so they did not seem to appreciate that values, when held as shared 
basic assumptions, actually constitute the deepest level of culture. 
It appears that F&O’s framework addresses espoused values, those values that organisations 
say they hold but may not actually adhere to.  Espoused values will not have a control effect 
if employees do not accept them, but can influence behaviour if employees see that they 
work and therefore adopt them.  However, only once they have been seen to work regularly 
over a long period of time will they become shared basic assumptions and therefore part of 
the culture.   
Because F&O do not seem to appreciate the difference between espoused values and 
shared basic assumptions, their framework will at times detect a control effect from values 
and at other times not.  This is misleading, confusing, and an undesirable state of affairs.  
This suggests that F&O’s framework should consider not just espoused values but shared 
basic assumptions as well, i.e. the values constituting the organisation’s culture. 
As far as clan culture is concerned, the conceptual literature spells out the circumstances 
under which clan formation is most likely, and also provides a rational explanation for the 
collaborative effort and self-control exhibited by members of a clan.  Empirical evidence of 
clan control was presented, and was also provided in the BIC case study.  Both the literature 
and the case study indicate that clan control is likely to be the most appropriate form of 















sub-units of organisations with high ambiguity, i.e. where means-ends relationships are not 
well understood, clan or cultural controls are likely to be more appropriate than market or 
bureaucratic forms of control. 
By applying F&O’s framework to the case study company, it was shown that the framework 
could not detect the manifestations of control which are typical of a clan-type culture.  As 
F&O’s framework is intended to identify control issues in all types of for-profit and not-for-
profit organisations, the inability of the framework to recognise clan control is another 
noteworthy shortcoming. 
Suggested amendments to F&O’s framework as proposed by Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) 
were evaluated, as these were said to address the cultural aspects of control omitted from 
F&O’s framework (Berry et al, 2009).  It was found that Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2009) 
conceptual model allows for the identification of situations where means-end relationships 
are not clear, but the solutions proposed do not suggest cultural control and do not address 
the inability of F&O’s framework to identify cultural or clan controls. 
The recommendation therefore is that F&O build upon Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2009) 
proposals, and where the F&O framework identifies situations where means-end 
relationships are not well understood, the possible existence of clan controls should be 
investigated. 
5.2.2 Artefacts and Personnel Controls 
The consensus view of artefacts and personnel controls which emerges from the literature is 
that they do not exert a direct control effect, but tend instead to facilitate cultural control 
and self control.  Artefacts, which include symbols, heroes, and rituals, represent the visible 
expression of culture.  They can assist in the understanding of culture, and via a change of 
artefacts help to support efforts to change the cultural paradigm.  Other writers on cultural 
change propose the employment of those artefacts which will help to forge new behaviours.   
F&O’s framework does not explicitly address artefacts, yet does make mention of vision and 
mission statements.  These are not considered to be visible expressions of culture as such, 
but rather by way of their content to provide an indication of the organisation’s values. 
Influential writers on culture such as Johnson (1992) and Schein (2004) (per Hughes, 2010) 
believe that control systems and performance management systems are in fact cultural 















its external environment.  Management control systems may therefore be chosen on the 
basis of management’s shared basic assumptions, i.e. of the organisation’s culture.  A 
thorough understanding of the organisation’s cultural paradigm may therefore be necessary 
before the choice of control systems can be understood. 
It is evident both from the literature and the case study findings that personnel controls can 
facilitate the development of a clan culture, by helping to achieve a better person-
organisation fit when recruiting staff.  By recruiting staff with similar values to those of the 
organisation, retention rates improve and clan control is strengthened.   
Regarding personnel controls, F&O’s framework does recognise performance evaluation 
processes, but in the context of performance management rather than the facilitation of 
cultural control. Performance evaluation is also regarded by F&O as a critical nexus in 
control activities rather than as a form of personnel control. 
It is clear from the literature that the identification of artefacts and the understanding of 
their meanings to members of the organisation are essential in deciphering an organisation’s 
culture.  Recognising the personnel controls employed by an organisation will also help in 
understanding its culture, and in appreciating why the culture facilitates self-control.  For 
this reason it is suggested that F&O’s framework should look to identify both artefacts and 
personnel controls. 
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are certain potential limitations pertaining to the case study data collected for this 
study.  There is a danger, for instance, particularly in the early stages of data gathering, that 
BIC employees were trying to create an impression rather than relay the facts as they 
perceived them (Young, 1999).  However, as BIC employees became used to the researcher’s 
presence over time, this effect diminished to a large extent if not completely.  Also, the same 
data was gathered from a number of different participants over different periods of time as 
a means of data triangulation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  This should have lessened the 
effects of any (conscious or unconscious) attempts at “impression management” (Young, 
1999). 
As far as the collection of cultural data is concerned, Johnson (1992) has indicated that a 















identify the cultural paradigm within which the organisation operates.  It is also implied that 
this is not necessarily a lengthy process. 
However, Schein (2004) points out that deeply-held assumptions do not always yield to 
short-term investigation.  It is possible, therefore, that certain aspects of BIC’s culture were 
not uncovered during the research process. 
This study also has limitations in terms of the type and size of organisation studied, i.e. a 
small, knowledge-intensive firm operating in a service industry.  This may limit the findings 
to firms of the same type, or to sub-units of larger firms which exhibit the same 
characteristics.  Future studies which examine the effects of socio-ideological controls in 
larger firms in a variety of different industries are therefore recommended so as to 
overcome these limitations. 
5.4 Wider Implications of the Study 
The review of the culture and other social science literature has highlighted certain issues 
which should be of concern to management control researchers: 
 Management accounting researchers should adopt a comprehensive and consistent 
view of culture, which embraces all levels of culture.  At present the word ‘culture’ is 
bandied about too loosely at times, and in a number of cases it is apparent that the 
nature of cultural control, clan control and personnel control has been 
misunderstood.  
 In the experience of this researcher, most management control papers which refer 
to clan control cite Ouchi’s 1979 and/or 1980 papers.  However, it is evident that 
Ouchi had only crystallised his thinking on clans some years later (e.g. Wilkins and 
Ouchi, 1983), and that his earlier conception of clan control appears to have 
identified an effect, but had not yet presented a plausible cause or causes for this 
effect.  This may have influenced the way in which clan controls have been 
understood, and the extent to which they have been accepted, in the management 
accounting literature. 
 Of some significance is the possibility that clan controls may be prevalent in modern, 















organisations.  This argument is presented in some detail on pages 31 to 33 of this 
study. 
 The literature suggests that the strength of an organisation’s cultural paradigm can 
make strategic change difficult, particularly if the necessary change requires a 
“paradigm shift” (Johnson, 1992).  This does not appear to have been acknowledged 
in performance management models such as the balanced scorecard, which might 
create the impression that strategic change is easier to achieve than might at times 
be the case. 
 The cultural paradigm is the ‘lens’ through which the organisation views the 
competitive landscape, and is the basis on which the organisation responds to 
opportunities and threats.  Assumptions regarding the impleme tation of strategy 
(and therefore the choice of controls) are also likely to be influenced by the cultural 
paradigm, and it may therefore be necessary to first understand the cultural 
paradigm before the organisation’s “bundle of controls” can properly be 
understood. 
 Finally, the contingency theory of control suggests that certain contextual variables 
have an impact on control systems design and use.  However, the contingency 
theory literature has not recognised that in many cases, (e.g. the external 
environment, strategy, organisational structure, ownership structure) it may not be 
the effect of the contingent variable as such that should  be considered, but the 
effect of management’s view of that variable, as filtered through the ‘lens’ of the 
organisation’s cultural paradigm. 
5.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
 Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework should be expanded to include the 
interrogation of socio-ideological controls as set out above.  The expanded 
framework should then be tested in a variety of organisations, using a single case 
study approach. 
 Researchers should investigate the possibility that the cultural paradigm frames the 
choice of management control and performance management systems.  
Furthermore, when examining the effect of the cultural paradigm on management 















question of what should be researched, but also of how this research should be 
conducted.  It is likely that multi-disciplinary research teams, comprised of 
management accountants and social scientists, would come up with a better 
understanding of cultural and other socio-ideological control issues than if the 
research were to be conducted by management accountants only. 
 The possibility that organisations other than knowledge-intensive firms are using 
clan controls should be investigated, particularly in firms which have to deal with 
high levels of environmental and/or technological change.  It is possible that, to 
survive in these environments, firms have to rely on bright capable employees who 
can exercise a high degree of self-control, which can be facilitated by clan-type 
cultures. 
 Research indicates that technocratic controls can at times be used to advantage in 
conjunction with socio-ideological controls.  However, the injudicious use of 
technocratic controls can be offensive to professional knowledge-workers, and can 
under these circumstances be counter-productive.  The most effective means of 
combining technocratic and socio-ideological controls should therefore be 
investigated. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
A multi-disciplinary review of the literature on cultural control, clan controls and personnel 
controls, and the application of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework to a small knowledge-
intensive firm, has highlighted the following: 
(i) F&O’s framework is robust to the extent that it is able to identify the 
technocratic controls employed by an organisation. 
(ii) F&O’s framework is deficient to the extent that it ignores the above-mentioned 
socio-ideological forms of control. 
In this post-industrial age, characterised by globalisation, the diffusion of new technologies, 
and pervasive non-linear change, many management control researchers are questioning 
the validity of the current management control framework (Nixon and Burns, 2005).  This 
study supports the view that socio-ideological forms of control have been ignored for too 
long by the majority of management accounting researchers, and that these control forms 
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Framework Questions and BIC Management Responses 
1. What is the vision and mission of the organization and how is this brought to the 
attention of managers and employees?  What mechanisms, processes, and networks 
are used to convey the organization’s overarching purposes and objectives to its 
members? 
 
“BIC’s mission statement succinctly tells staff, suppliers and customers what business 
we are in and how we intend to meet their needs.  It is displayed in reception, on screen 
savers and is drummed home at staff inductions, strategic reviews and briefings.  We 
regard it as essential in communicating our mission to all stakeholders.  We have 
worded it like a twenty-second “elevator pitch” so that staff and management can rattle 
it off readily if asked.” – CEO 
“Our detailed vision we regard as being pertinent to senior management only.  It is 
objective in that it gives details of where we are taking the company in terms of 
revenues, target markets and technologies.  We don’t think our vision should be 
available for public consumption.  Our broader vision, ‘To be South Africa’s Number 
One BI supplier of choice by striving for excellence in everything we do,’ is drummed 
home to all staff at every opportunity.” – CEO 
This question also requires the identification of the organisation’s core values, as well as 
the methods (both formal and informal) by which they are communicated to 
employees.  The answer to this question is comprehensive, and has been covered in 
detail in chapter 4 of this study. 
 
2. What are the key factors that are believed to be central to the organization’s overall 
future success and how are they brought to the attention of managers and employees? 
 
“Future success will depend on working with the management team to establish a clear 
vision of the future, communicating this to all staff, and putting the mechanisms in 
place to remind management of the agreed strategies to get us there.  It is also 















how they and their departments will benefit if we achieve our strategic objectives.  As a 
management team we review our performance against strategic objectives on a 
quarterly basis, based on individual and team KPI’s (key performance indicators) which 
are linked to strategic objectives.  Annual bonuses are also based on meeting KPI 
targets.” – CEO 
 
“Our people are our greatest resource; having good managers and the best people we 
can afford in all positions is paramount to our success.” – CEO 
 
“The ability to attract and retain the best people is what this business is all about.” – 
Sales Manager, Cape Town, and later Managing Director after management buy-out. 
 
“Our graduate recruitment scheme is turning out to be a great success in terms of hiring 
talented youngsters and keeping them in the business.  Going forward, I can see it 
having a very positive impact.” – Branch Manager, Cape Town. 
 
3. What is the organization structure and what impact does it have on the design and use 
of performance management systems (PMSs)?  How does it influence and how is it 
influenced by the strategic management process? 
 
BIC has branches in three major centres – Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.  In 
this way it is able to serve the major markets in South Africa.  The Johannesburg branch 
serves as the Head Office, where the CEO is also the branch manager.  The branch 
structure does not have a significant effect on performance management systems; as 
BIC uses common BI tools, common KPIs and a common reporting format, information 
can be easily compared and consolidated.  Electronic and telephonic communication 
between branches is conducted on a daily basis. 
 
 
4. What strategies and plans has the organization adopted and what are the processes 
and activities that it has decided will be required for it to ensure its success?  How are 
















BIC adopts a differentiation strategy, based on the good reputation of its BI software 
product, its record of excellent service delivery to large and small customers, and the 
national coverage possible from its three branches.  BIC’s ability to provide solid 
customer references across many industries (compared to their newer competitors) is 
seen as a strong selling point.   
The strategic plan is compiled after a consultative process involving all members of the 
management team, and incorporates an agreed ‘stretch’ element for each branch (at 
the time of the case study, BIC was pursuing a market growth strategy). 







 Broad-based black economic empowerment 
Annual budgets (prepared by each branch manager) represent the first year of the 
strategic plan, and all management incentives are based on KPIs derived from the 
strategic objectives.  Progress against strategic objectives is measured quarterly. 
Strategic objectives are communicated to staff annually via briefing sessions held at 
each branch.  Monthly results are also presented to branch staff. 
 
 
5. What are the organization’s key performance measures deriving from its objectives, key 
success factors, and strategies and plans?  How are these specified and communicated 
and what role do they play in performance evaluation?  Are there significant omissions? 
 
As set out in the answers to Question 4, objectives are set in seven key areas of the 
business, with a number of key performance indicators being established for each 
objective.  These are communicated on an annual, quarterly and monthly basis, as 















strategic plan.  Most objectives and KPIs are quantitative in nature, although a customer 
satisfaction survey was conducted by an independent consultancy. 
6. What level of performance does the organization need to achieve for each of its key 
performance measures (identified in the above question), how does it go about setting 
appropriate performance targets for them, and how challenging are those performance 
targets?  
 
“A review of past performance, going back a good few years, is essential in identifying 
the level of financial performance we can target, both as being reasonable and including 
a stretch to ensure growth.  In addition, one also looks to external listed competitors in 
the same industry to get an idea of GM, PBT as a percentage of sales, and what their 
growth in revenues have been like. 
Over time and with experience one refines these, based on an understanding of what 
the market can bear and one’s own internal costs.  Strategic objectives are based on 
past performance, external reviews and one’s own experience.  They will differ for each 
industry and whether one is in a commodity or high growth niche, for example.  World 
class performance is generally considered to be a consistent 10% real year-on-year 
growth – greater when small and in a high growth niche, and less when in a mature 
industry.  In IT this is what I strive for.  Management need to apply their minds and 
make a judgement call in setting these objectives.” – CEO 
“In setting targets, I try to use logic to judge what is reasonably achievable, make that 
the 75% level, with 70% being the minimum standard acceptable and 100% being the 
stretch target.  There is some logic involved, but all forecasts are one’s best guess based 
on the information at hand coupled with experience.” – CEO 
Input from branch managers on targets is received by CEO, but the final decision 
regarding targets is made by him. 
 
7. What processes, if any, does the organization follow for evaluating individual, group, 
and organizational performance?  Are performance evaluations primarily objective, 
subjective or mixed and how important are formal and informal information and 















“With individuals we use a formal performance appraisal, during which we review the 
individual’s performance and mutually set objective goals which are in line with the 
company strategic plans (including the budget).  Such goals include personal and team 
development goals so that all staff have an element of personal growth to keep them 
sharp.  Group and organisational performance are evaluated at the quarterly strategic 
review on the basis of the company’s and branches’ performance against the 
strategy/budgets.” – CEO 
“I have always tried to set objective measurements and keep the subjectivity out of the 
measurement.  Having BI tools makes this significantly easier than it would be without 
these.  Without information it is very difficult to objectively measure people, groups, 
and the company’s performance as a whole.  Without objective measures in place, 
managers at all levels tend to avoid confrontation and tend not to be firm on evaluating 
or providing honest feedback on poor and under par performance.  Objective measures 
therefore tend to drive a higher level of strategic achievement” – CEO 
“Informal feedback needs to be provided on an ongoing basis to remind management 
particularly of the strategies in place and that the leader is serious about evaluating and 
rewarding performance based on results, not just the perception of hard work.  I have 
found that both management and staff will get demotivated if one overdoes the 
information flow and references to the strategy, staff more so as they have less of the 
bigger picture understanding.  This is where encouragement of the individual staff 
member, positive recognition and such are essential in order to achieve the 
performance needed to achieve group or company objectives.” – CEO 
 
8. What rewards — financial and/or non-financial — will managers and other employees 
gain by achieving performance targets or other assessed aspects of performance (or, 
conversely, what penalties will they suffer by failing to achieve them)? 
 
“The main drivers of business success are the management and as such they are largely 
financially rewarded at the year-end based on profits as well as KPI achievement.  In 
addition, management were given access to purchase a few shares (20% of the equity) 















Some non-financial rewards are provided to high performing employees in the form of 
access to further product training and particular types of work experience.  This is an 
area where other incentives such as time to work with fellow staff on CSI [corporate 
social investment] projects have been considered but not put into place. 
There is a group reward system in the form of a thirteenth cheque for all staff following 
the audit if the business meets its PBT budget.  This does not apply to sales persons, 
who earn commission on sales at varying percentages depending on the strategic 
importance of the sales, e.g. new licence sales earned.” – CEO 
 
9. What specific information flows — feedback and feed-forward —, systems and 
networks has the organization in place to support the operation of its PMSs? 
 
BI tools produce reports which give feedback on budget variances and KPIs on a 
monthly basis (although performance against KPIs is formally addressed on a quarterly 
basis).  Feedforward information derived formally from the annual SWOT and PESTEL 
analyses, and from sales managers obtaining knowledge of competitor activity on an 
ongoing basis in the course of canvassing for new business, and even from liaising with 
existing clients. 
E-mail facilitates communication throughout the company, and with consultants at 
clients’ premises.  Informal feedback received from consultants at Friday afternoon 
drinks and snacks (when all consultants are required to report back to their branches). 
 
 
10. What type of use is made of information and of the various control mechanisms in 
place? Can these uses be characterised in terms of various typologies in the literature?  
How do controls and their uses differ at different hierarchical levels? 
 
Most formal control systems are used diagnostically, with (apart from the SWOT and 

















11.  How have the PMSs altered in the light of the change dynamics of the organization and 
its environment?  Have the changes in PMSs design or use been made in a proactive or 
reactive manner? 
 
Although demand for BI products was high and the market was growing, this did not 
necessitate a change in PMSs which remained stable. 
 
 
12.  How strong and coherent are the links between the components of PMSs and the ways 
in which they are used (as denoted by the above 11 questions)? 
 
There is a theoretical link between strategy and operations, with strategic objectives 
supposedly being operationalised via KPIs.  However, the achievement of most KPIs is 
dependent on self control initiatives by BI consultants (facilitated by clan controls), so 
that KPIs cannot be acted upon directly.  Financial incentives drive performance for 
management and sales staff, but BI consultants have little influence over their incentive 
bonuses (13th cheques based on achieving budgeted PBT targets).  Non-financial 
rewards for BI staff are subjectively determined.  There is a low level of interactive use 
of formal systems, but this is compensated for by the use of informal systems. 
Espoused company values form part of the strategic planning cycle, and are intended to 
guide the behaviours by which strategy is operationalised.  However, there are clashes 
between certain of the deeply held assumptions of the CEO and the branch managers, 
which serve to undermine the strategic effort to some extent.  This effect cannot be 
detected by Ferreira and Otley’s framework questions – See Chapter 4 for a detailed 
discussion of these issues. 
 
